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By DON A. AFFELDT

Comment on Current Issues

A Study in Audacity
There is only one word to use in describing the recent American commando raid on the North Vietnamese prisoner of war camp at Son Tay. The raid was
audacious.
"Audacious" has, however, two main meanings, each
quite opposed to the other. The marvelous and murderous raid on Son Tay illustrated both meanings perfectly .
An audacious act is an act which is intrepidly daring,
adventurous and spirited . It is also an act which shows
contempt for the restraints of law, religion , or decorum .
The raid on Son Tay was an act of both sorts.
Intrepid daring. The fearlessness - or, more probably, the bravery - of the commandos who made the
raid is beyond question. The difficulty of their intended
feat is revealed by the fact that the Air Force thought
it desirable and necessary to construct a full-scale model
of the target compound and to rehearse the assault for
a full three months. After 150 practice drops on the
simulated camp, the volunteers of the task force were
exquisitely poised for the mission. "You build your
heart up for something like this, " said one of the fliers .
"Every nerve in your body wants it. "
The mission itself involved an aerial plunge, under
cover of darkness, deep into enemy territory. In the
helicopters were men who didn't really know what kind
of opposition they would meet. Amid a torrent of tracer
bullets and in spite of a downed lead chopper, the fliers attacked and searched the camp. Their goal: the
recapture of about fifty U .S. prisoners of war. The sixty
men of the company pitted themselves against death in
order to rescue at best an equal number of their countrymen. No critical strategic advantage was at issue here.
Nor could the purpose plausibly be said to have been
the saving of lives, for it is far from clear that captured
American prisoners are dying in any large numbers at
North Vietnamese hands. Clearly risking your life to
possibly improve the lot of one of your countrymen requires, and clearly exhibits, intrepid daring.
Adventurousness . Both the soldiers who participated
in the raid and the officers and civilians who conceived
it showed a willingness to take sizable risks in pursuit
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of their objective. The physical risk to the men involved
is undeniable. But perhaps more serious were the risks
the assault posed for the prisoners of war the mission
was designed to benefit, and those of their comrades
who would not have been rescued on this mission even
if it had been completely successful.
Who could have said, prior to the raid, what reprisals the North Vietnamese might have visited on the unrescued prisoners still at their mercy? And though it
seems clear that the POWs held by the North Vietnamese are not receiving very favorable treatment, how
much clearer isn't it that their lot would be materially
worsened by a raid such as this?
At the very least, the raid once again revealed to the
world the vulnerability of North Vietnam to the sophisticated military equipment of the American armed
forces. No nation likes such weakness - if only weakness in hardware - revealed to the world. And given
the ways of nations, it is not unreasonable to expect
that such an insult as this raid constituted would be
replied to. The most likely and fitting victims of that
reply are the very persons the raid was supposed to
help: American prisoners of war.
There are, however, other risks run in a venture of
this sort. Whether as a cover for the raid or as a gratuitous accompaniment of it, the American military took
that occasion to resume its bombing of certain North
Vietnamese targets. In the bombing near Hanoi, 49
civilians were reportedly killed, and a number of POWs
injured. No one knows how many enemy soldiers were
killed in this resumption of the bombing, but it is safe
to suppose that the dead numbered at least as many as
the entire population of American POWs in North Vietnam - roughly 378 persons.
The resumption of the bombing hardly promises to
expedite the stalemated peace talks in Paris. And, of
course, the resumption of bombing will not on any account help to end the war; this tactic has been employed
before, and with much greater vigor, without having
that result. Thus the resumption of bombing would appear to offer only negative possibilities. In this light,
the raids appear to be not only adventurous, but possibly even foolhardy .
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retreat. I frankly have my doubts as to whether the
risks of a "cut and run" policy are all that great. I suppose that is a matter of legitimate disagreement among
citizens, and a decision for which the President is ultimately responsible.

The Spirit of Son Tay
Spirit. Whatever else one m ay say about the raid on
Son Tay, one must concede that it showed considerable
spirit. Indeed, it was spirit-giving. It inspired American civilians, American soldiers, and - if they ever
learned of it - it is safe to say that the raid inspired
American prisoners of war in North Vietnam.
It is vitally important that a government occasionally
inspire its citizens. The inspiration needed is not very
difficult to bring off; the reason it is needed is just that
it happens all too infrequently. Most citizens of a country have certain ideals and hopes for their nation as a
whole. Government is instituted, roughly, to secure and
promote those ideals and hopes. Occasionally it succeeds, conspicuously, in doing just that. Were it never
to succeed in its purposes, it would not last for long.
One of the ideals of free democratic men is solidarity
in a common enterprise. Whether or not everyone app~oves a given course of action, there is a presumption
that the vast majority of citizens will contribute to, or
at least not oppose, actions based on decisions of the
group. Out of this presumption arise some expectations .
In warfare, one of the expectations is that your country will not completely abandon you even if you fall into
the hands of the enemy. If a man's fellows do not honor
this expectation when possible, the expectation will
eventually be defeated, with the result that men may be
less willing to risk actions which could result in their
capture. Thus are the strengths of united action dissipated to the point where, finally, it is every man for
himself, all the time. And that is the refutation of political society.
This analysis is strained by the particulars of the Vietnam involvement. I need not rehearse the sorry facts
which raise a question about the application of some of
the statements just made to the war in Vietnam. But
even though the wisdom , indeed the morality, of our
invo\vement in Vietnam is very far from obvious, it
still remains true that this nation simply cannot afford
to ignore certain elemental obligations to its soldiers,
whether they be (wrongly) on the battlefield or (unwillingly) detained in a prisoner of war camp. To do so is
to put pivotal ideals of our people to a cruel and needless test. Whether or not we can afford the mistake of
having gone to war in Vietnam, we may very well not be
able to afford the mistake of inattention to what may yet
be on the line in our subsequent actions.
Something like this is, I take it, what counsels a phased
withdrawal from Vietnam rather than a "cut and run"
4

It is also perhaps uncertain whether a show of loyalty
and remembrance toward American prisoners is all
that important to them, or to the nation. What is clear
is that it is possible that these things be so. Thus actions
based on these considerations may be rightly conceived
- whether or not they are properly executed. If the raid
on Son Tay was conceived for these reasons, those who
. conceived it and carried it out were spirited persons.
And those Americans who were inspired by the act were
responding to something which lies close indeed to the
heart of what this country represents.
There is, however, another side to the ledger, as there
nearly always is in matters so complex as war. It is altogether possible that the raid on Son Tay was but another instance of crass American contempt for both law and
morality.
I have been astonished at the general unwillingness
of Americans to conceive the possibility that the majority of prisoners held by the North Vietnamese are, indeed, war criminals, fully deserving of death at the
hands of their captors. That so many of us refuse to
acknowledge even the possibility that this is so is the
more surprising since the concept of a war criminal is
largely our own invention .
Consider, if you will, just who these men are who are
being detained by the North Vietnamese. A typical prisoner, I would guess, is a man who , moments before capture, was piloting a plane which was raining bombs (quite
indiscriminately, I gather) on North Vietnam. His pl'ane
was shot down, though he parachuted fairly safely to
earth. He was found and arrested by persons who , had he
not been shot down, might well have been his next victims. No one can say with certainty just how many persons the pilot managed to destroy before his accident;
nor can one estimate the damage done to the country
of North Vietnam by the awesome explosives the pilot
discharged just before capture.
It is suggested by the Geneva accords that such prisoners "must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity." Whatever for?
Surely justice makes no such demands. These men
were murderers. They intentionally took the lives of
other human beings. And, what is more, they did so by
employing for the purpose incredible weapons of destruction, much more indiscriminate than selective in
their effects. Barbarities like this collectively make
up what we call warfare. That they constitute warfare
makes them no less barbarous, however. The intentional killing of 10,000 people is no less murder than is the
slow strangulation of one solitary soul.
The Cresset

POW's as War Criminals
Moral predicates do not cease attaching to acts of
consummate immorality just because of their enormity. To suggest that they do is to betray oneself as
totally lacking any moral sensitivity whatever.
America could perhaps properly continue to participate in the songs and dances which periodically emanate from Geneva if only our own national face were
less reddened with shame. When, however, our exploits
to free our prisoners are balanced in the news with reports of our pushing POWs from our helicopters to their
death in order to loosen tongues among their horrified,
watching compatriots, the lie is given to the basis of our
appeal for humane treatment of American prisoners.
International law is a form of treaty, and when one side
breaks the treaty, it is no longer binding on the other
party.

It is, of course, no more moral for North Vietnam to
maltreat our prisoners than it is for us to maltreat the
prisoners we hold. The morality of the treatment of
prisoners is, in fact, decided on other grounds. Yet even
on those grounds it is far from clear that the prisoners
held by North Vietnam deserve more than a painless
death, or, at the least, life imprisonment. But of course
to affirm this view, one must consider whether their
warring acts were justified.
If they were not - and I rather think they were not
- then it is hard to find much moral basis for sympathy
with them. And if there is little moral (or legal) basis
for sympathy, there is, to that extent, little justification
for further warring acts in pursuit of their liberation.
On these grounds, then, the raid on Son Tay was just as
contemptuous of law and morality as were the acts which
resulted in the prisoners' being there in the first place.
These are, I think the conceptual parameters for
evaluating the commando raid on Son Tay. The verdict
on the question of the justification of that act now goes
to the jury on the facts of the case. Who knows what these
are? Given the Pentagon's proclivity for secrecy about
this and other national affairs, you and I may never
know what judgment to make. But if we must make a
judgment - and as responsible citizens we very well
might need to - we can only do it on the available facts .
What judgment do those facts now dictate?

Letters to the Editor
Dear Mr. Vandersee:
Re your column in the November, 1970 ,
issue: Through my church 's budget I (and
many , many thousands of other Lutherans )
support our university , accepting it as an institution that. among other things. deals with
students in terms of arbitrary academic contracts.
Since you consider such a posture hypocritical , why , in honesty to yourself and that
institution , don't you join the staff of some
other-structured or non-structured of whatever it is you consider a non-hypocritical
school? Such schools exist; they attempt to
serve their own purposes in their own way.
To accept position and salary from an institution committed to what you consider a
hypocritical academic structure - especially
when there are alternatives available to you leads me to quote your column : "The other
name of the game is Hypocrisy ."
John Bleeke
Racine , Wisconsin

Mr. Vandersee replies:
Mr. Bleeke's is a welcome letter. Practically
the only writing paid attention to these days
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is invective or pornography; thus the Cresset
is accustomed to oblivion. Evidently a new
reader, Mr. Bleeke will not have noticed my
occasional mention of teaching in Virginia ,
not at Valparaiso . As a Valparaiso alumnus.
however, I salute his congregation in Racine
for its fraternal support of the university in
a time when unscriptural fear and false witness often combine to undermine men and
institutions committed to pursuing truth and
justice.
As for why I stay where I am: The "drop
out" attitude of alienated malcontents is not
to my taste, nor is the "get out" attitude of
surly, self-righteous establishmentarians.
Where to, after all? I don't believe you can
escape hypocrisy - it's a fallen world we live
in (the idealistic view of reader Bleeke notwithstanding), and hypocn·sy is the grease
that lubricates human relationships. The
important thing is to be fully aware of it and
make do with as little as possible.
I have faith in the God of history, hope that
our excess hypocn·sy can diminish, and charity toward students who meanwhile are in
danger of being damaged by their idealism.
In short, the petulant and hopeless separatism
that Mr. B/eeke advises, founded as it is on

a dubious and certainly unchnstian theology
of human nature, is advice that I as a responsible Christian must firmly decline.

Dear Mr. Strietelmeier:
Re your column in the November, 1970.
issue: I have noted with some approval the
make-up of your cabinet. After your election
to the presidency of the U.S.A ., however, you
might consider dropping at least one professor of geography from your cabinet in order
to avoid the charge that you are an obvious
captive of certain interests.
As a faithful reader of your column , sir, I
must bring to your attention the fact that you
and I share a primary weakness which we
must occasionall y acknowledge to ourselves;
namely , our delusions of adequacy.
Lester Lange
San Jose, California

Mr. Strietelmeier replies:
Don't unhinge me. I am able to maintain
delusions of adequacy only because I am an
obvious captive of certain interests.
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The Relevance of the Revelation
By WILLIAM STRINGFELLOW

Attorney-at-Law
Block Island
Rhode Island
One of the peculiar insights of the Book of Revelation - that most curious, and most neglected, part of
the Bible - is that the doom of Babylon, the great city,
occasions a celebration in heaven.
The scene, as depicted in the biblical images, does not
seem to be one appropriate to r~joicing. The once
mighty city is laid waste. Everything is despoiled. It
has become a place haunted by death. Judgment has
happened. Even the dirge of the kings and the merchants of the earth over the fall of Babylon has finished.
The great city can be found no more. There is such
desolation that silence is all that is left.
It is at this silence that "the voice of a great multitude
in heaven" cries "Hallelujah!" and sings a hymn of
triumph. How odd, as it seems to us, that the death of a
society- especially, perhaps, the violent disintegration
of this most rich and most powerful of all nations, Babylon - should incite jubilation in heaven.
If you examine the Babylon texts in the New Testament, you will find that the song of the heavenly chorus
is punctuated by a refrain repeated three times, each in
different words:
"Hallelujah! Salvation and glory and power belong to
our God . ... "
"Hallelujah! The smoke from her [Babylon]' goes
up for ever and ever. ... "
"Hallelujah! For the Lord our God the Almighty
reigns."
Odd, indeed! These various refrains are, in their biblical context, interchangeable. They each have the same
meaning. They are, literally, refrains, in which the
destruction of the city is, somehow, associated with the
salvation of the world and in which Babylon's doom is
accounted as a sign of the sovereignty of God over men
and nations.
It is a pity that Americans have been so steadfastly
inattentive to the Bible, for all their contrary pretentiousness in the country's public rituals and for all their
religiosity concerning the popular fictions as to the nation's destiny. It is specifically a misfortune, I suggest,
that most Americans, whether or not they harbor a
church connection, are either ignorant or obtuse about
Revelation and the issues raised in the Babylon passages. Had the American inheritance been different,
had Americans been far less religiose a;.d far more bibThis article is excerpted from a speech of another title delivered at
St. Paul's Lutheran Church, Melrose Park, Illinois. October 21. 1970 .
under the auspices of the Lutheran Human Relations Association of
America.
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lical, had the American experience as a nation not been
so Babylonian, we might have been edified - in a fearfuL wonderful and timely way - by this biblical witness,
and we might find ourselves in more hopeful and more
happy circumstances today.
Instead, Americans, for the most part, have dismissed
the Bible as apolitical, a private witness shrouded in
holy neutrality so far as politics is concerned, having
nothing beyond vague exhortion to do with the nation
as such, relegated to the peripheries of social conflict.
Thereby, we have actually suppressed the Bible, since it
is intrinsically politicaL
The treatment of the particular book which I cite
here, The Revelation to John, is the notorious illustration at point. We have deemed it esoteric poetry, to be
put aside as inherently obscure and impractical by definition, or we have regarded it, somewhat apprehensively, as a diary of psychedelic visions inappropriately
appended to the rest of Scripture. Or else we have suffered the arrogant pietism of itinerant evangelists
preaching a quaint damnation from fragments of the
book and acquiesced to their boast that that is what Relevation is about. Or some have demeaned the whole of
the Bible by distorting this book as a predestinarian
chronicle. Most often, I observe, Americans, including
professed Christians and habituated churchgoers, have
just been wholly indifferent to Revelation.
Whatever reasons can be assigned for it, Americans
have overlooked the Book of Revelation - and, specifically, its exposition of the Babylon episode - and,
thus, fail to comprehend Revelation as an ethical literature concerning the character and timeliness of God's
judgment, not merely of persons, but over nations and,
in truth, over all principalities and powers. As such except for the accounts in the gospels of the Crucifixion
of Jesus Christ- this book is manifestly the most political part of the Bible.
If this be so, as I believe it to be so, it is a significant
dimension of, as well as a partial explanation of America's moral impoverishment, in which all citizens share,
although, as with so much else in this country, not
e9ually.
Item:

Item:

Moral poverty obviously threatens the prosperous more than the economically deprived because the affluent have more at risk, both materially and psychically, in any social crisis.
Moral poverty, similarly, afflicts the middleaged more than the young because they have
existed longer in conformity and do not have
The Cresset

enough time left to change - even if they could
discern how to change.
Item:

Item:

Item:

Moral poverty is more virulent among whites
than blacks or Indians or Chicanos because their
lives and livelihoods have been subsidized by
racial privilege for 350 years on this continent,
and white Americans are not about to allow that
to be upset.
Moral poverty is a larger burden for those in
nominal leadership or those in power in the
ruling institutions of society than to those who
remain unorganized, unrepresented, unheeded,
powerless or, seemingly, hapless victims of institutional processes and techniques because the
incumbents in power and the reputed leaders
are on the scene where social renewal must
originate.
And- as if it requires mention- moral poverty
is most insidious in exactly the precincts where
moral sensibility is most pathetically needed at
this moment: among those who exercise the
authority of the State, prosecutors and policemen, as well as judges and cabinet officers, and
in the presidency, as compared, say, to defendants in political trials, or those vulnerable to
preventive detention, or those murdered under
a guise of legality, or those driven into exile, or
those whose lives are squandered in vainglorious war, because the only authority of the State
is its last authority: death.

Please notice that the penury, in a moral sense, which
beleaguers so severely Americans of privilege, affluence, power or similar vested interest in the inherited
and established order - and which affects all citizens,
in one way or another, of whatever fate or fortune in the
status quo - is not the same matter as imputing malignity to the middle classes or the middleaged or the whites
or the institutional hierarchies or those in political
offire. God knows (it is God's vocation, not any man's,
to exercise such knowledge) America has wicked men in
high places, and it may be that there is a relationship
between personal immorality and conventional success
in this society, but that is not the issue raised here in
emphasizing the nation's moral poverty.
I mean by "moral impoverishment" what the Bible
repeatedly cites as "hardness of the heart." I refer not so
much to an evil conscience as to a paralyzed conscience;
not as much to either individual or corporate immorality as to a social pathology possessing both persons and
institutions; not to a malevolence, however incarnate,
as to the literal demoralization of society. If there be
evildoers in the Pentagon or on Wall Street or among
university trustees and administrators or on Madison
Avenue or in the cabinet (It would be utterly astonishing if there were not) that is not nearly as morally significant as the occupation of these same places by men
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who have become captive and immobilized as human
beings by their obeisance, either eager or coerced, to
institutions or other principalities as idols.
These are persons who have become so entrapped in
tradition, or, often, mere routine, who are so fascinated
by institutional machination, who are so much in bondage to the cause of preserving the principality oblivious
or callous to the consequences and costs for others or
for themselves that they have been thwarted in their
moral development. They are invalided in the capacity
of moral discernment, and they are deprived of moral
acumen.
To furnish some definite examples, I refer to those
public and corporate figures who denounce both human
reason and conscience by naming the escalation of war
a promise of peace, or mention the ecological crisis
while advocating, in the same breath, unrestricted expansion of the American economy, or praise the rule of
law but ridicule the First and Fifth Amendments by
authorizing the repression of citizens who dare use their
constitutional rights, or conjure up a sniper every time
they murder a black.

Babylon as a Parable for America
However many evil men hold positions in the American establishment, they are far outnumbered, by my
tally, by men bereft of conscience, so pathetically have
they been dehumanized by the principalities and powers
for which they are acolytes. And if the moral problem
on such supposedly exalted levels of society is not so
much wicked men as morally retarded men, then think
of the cruel and somber daily existence of the multitudes of automatons of lower status and lesser privilege,
who have not even an illusion of power, the condiments
of office, an impressive reputation, or real wealth to
insulate or console themselves from the imperious and
obdurate totalitarian claims of the principalities against
human life in society.
For such folk - lately ridiculed, on all sides (though
most cynically by their erstwhile champions), as "the
silent majority" - the American institutional and ideological ethos incubates a profound apathy toward human life as such. For them, the American experience induces a fearful obtuseness to their own elementary selfinterest as human beings, not to mention an inbred indifference to human freedom which materializes as a
default toward the humanity of others which is morally
equivalent to hostility toward other men. Somehow,
the American bourgeoisie are nurtured and conformed
in a manner that results in a strange and terrible quitting as human beings.
For these Americans, I suggest, it is not so much that
they have been brainwashed - although it is the fact
that they have been - as that they have been stupefied
7

as persons, and as a class of persons, and thus relieved
of moral sanity.
From this reign of death, there are by now only such
apparent respites or escapes as commercial sports and
entertainments, booze, indulgence in nostalgia for a
fictional past, and a spectator's role at moonshots, presidential performances, and (as the main diversion)
officially sanctioned persecutions of those who are not
conformed.
It goes without saying, in my view, that moral decadence in the connotations specified here so pervades our
society that one can discern and identify maturity, conscience and, ironically, freedom in human beings only
among those who are in conflict with the. established
order - those who are opponents of the status quo,
those in rebellion against the system, those who are
fugitives and victims. And only by the same token, incidentally, can one postulate any ground of hope for a
viable future for the American nation.

Moral Deprivation and Demonic Possession
The failure of conscience in American society among
its so-called leaders, the contempt for human life among
the managers of society, and the moral deprivation of
the "middle Americans" resembles, as has been noted,
the estate described, biblically, as "hardness of the
heart." This same condition, afflicting both individuals
and institutions (including nations), is otherwise designated in the Bible as a form of demonic possession. If
that seems a quaint allusion, more or less meaningless
in modern times, keep in mind that demonic refers to
death comprehended as a moral power.
Hence, for a man to be possessed of a demon means
that he is a prisoner of the power of death in one or
another of the concrete manifestations which death
assumes in history. Mental or physical illness are lucid
examples in point, but the moral impairment of a person is an instance of demonic possession as well. Similarly, a nation, or any other principality, may be such a
dehumanizing reality with respect to human life in society, may be of such anti-human purpose and policy,
may pursue such a course which so demeans human life
and so profits death that it must be said that that nation,
or other principality, is, in truth, governed by the
power of death.
The outstanding example in the earlier part of the
twentieth century of a nation and society, and its majority classes, and its leaders, existing in exactly this way
is, of course, Nazi Germany. The biblical story of such
a realm is the saga of Babylon. The startling instance
in the present time of the same situation is the U.S.A.
That is not to say that Nazi Germany and contemporary American totalitarianism are identical. There are
significant and literally ominous comparisons that are
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justified between the two, but there are distinctions of
importance, too, that argue against too hasty or over
simple equation of one with the other. (For one thing,
the ideological element, so notorious in Nazi totalitarianism, is, to an appreciable extent, displaced by the
technological factor in American totalitarianism. For
another, Adolph Hitler was, whatever else he was, a
genius, while the same cannot be said of any of the incumbents in our highest offices.)
What I do say is that Babylon represents the essential
version of the demonic in triumph in a nation. Babylon
is a parable for Nazi Germany. Babylon is a parable for
America. In that way, there is an inherent and idiopathic connection between the Nazi happening in the
thirties and what is now happening in America.
I do not, by the way, overlook a sense in which the
biblical witness in the Babylon material may be regarded as an apocalyptic parable, having cosmic as well as
historic relevance. Indeed, within the sphere of apocalyptic insight, the Babylon epic bespeaks the moral
character of every nation which is or which has ever
been or which may ever be. I am deliberately putting
this emphasis in the background, however, lest anyone
embrace it as an excuse to play down or gainsay the
specific relevance of Babylon for the American experIence.
There is the danger, I expect, that in so treating the
Babylon adventure that some will conclude that these
times in America are apocalyptic and then go on to confuse an American apocalypse with The Apocalypse.
Well, these are apocalyptic days for America, I believe,
but an American apocalypse is not apt to be the terminal event of history. To indulge this confusion is, I think,
a perverse form of the same vanity in which the "American dream" of the popular mythology concerning a
unique destiny of the American nation has come, to so
many, many Americans, to mean grandiose visions of
paradise found.
Americans of all sorts, of every faction and each generation, by now, have suffered enough the consequences - which only glorify death - of our ridiculous
national vanity and of the truly incredible theological
naivete from which it issues.
My concern is for the exorcism of that vain spirit.
My plea is for freedom from this awful naivete. My
hope, as a human being, begins in the truth that America is Babylon. I invite you to hear - and to heed the cry of the heavenly multitude:
"Hallelujah! Salvation and glory and power belong to
our God . ... "
"Hallelujah! The smoke from her [Babylon] goes
up for ever and ever. ... "
"Hallelujah! For the Lord our God the Almighty
reigns."
The Cresset

The Stance of an Art Critic in a Time of Transition
By WALTER SORELL
Th e Cresset D epartmental Editor for the Theatre
N ew York, New York

Each age gets the art it deserves.
At one of the early Pop art exhibitions I stood in front
of a refrigerator. The door was intriguingly left ajar.
When another visitor tried to close the door, I involuntarily blurted: "Don't touch it! This is an object of art! "
The man took back his hand with an apologetic nod ,
believing that my cries were not mockery but witnessing
to a devout faith in la vie pour l 'art.
At that moment I asked myself: What do I feel about
a refrigerator exhibited as a work of art ? What is my
critical judgment? I have mostly viewed refrigerators
with cool indifference, albeit with some appreciation
for their utilitarian purposes. The aesthetic possibilities
of a refrigerator with its door ajar, however, left me cold
and numbed. Even if I was then unable to verbalize my
aesthetic judgment, I knew it was sound.
This happened to me a few years ago. Looking back
on it today I cannot help feeling that not very much has
changed since then in the world of art. Only more perplexing and confusing aspects of that world are more
recognizable.
How is the critic to react to a piece of soundless music
like John Cage's piano piece, Four Minutes, Thirtythree Seconds? The pianist sits in front of the piano for
that length of time without touching the keys and only
suggests three movements by lifting his arms three
times. Cage once said that his "favorite piece is the one
we can hear all the time if we are quiet." I s the noncomposing composer trying to say that the accidental noises
in the room are music? This is an extreme example of
a desperate generation's attempt to blur the boundaries
between life and art.
How is one to react critically to the first scene of
Mysteries, produced by The Living Theatre, in which
an actor stands at attention without batting an eyelash
while staring at the audience for eighteen minutes?
Does it represent the Zen concepts, introduced into the
arts notably by Merce Cunningham and John Cage, that
there is stillness in movement and movement in stillness?
How about the ready-made and minimal art? Marcel
Duchamp had the idea of painting a moustache on a
reproduction of the Mona Lisa, and Robert Rauschenberg played with the notion of destructive creativity by
erasing a drawing by de Kooning and exhibiting it
This article is excerpted from a speech of another title delivered during
the week of the dedication of C hri st College of Valparaiso University,
April 20 . 1970 .
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under the title Erased de Kooning by Robert Rauschenberg. Andy Warhol published an advertisement that
anyone could come to him with any piece of whatever
he could get hold of and he would sign it and, through
his signature, tum each piece into a piece of art by Andy
Warhol. How minimal can you sink?
The belief that everything is possible in art has a long
tradition by now. It goes back at least to the onset of this
century. The news of that belief has gotten out to almost
everybody in seven decades. In the late fifties, and even
more so in the sixties, the traditional concept of art as
the creation of order out of chaos has come full circle.
Art, the contemporary artist seems to claim, has now to
create chaos. Art is no longer one of the means whereby
man seems to order a life which is experienced as chaos.
It has a different task. We could nearly equate the human rage for chaos of which Morse Packham speaks
with Andre Malraux's definition of art as the revolt
against man's fate.
As a matter of fact, we have now, in the arts, been revolting against our fate for more than seventy years.
We like to speak euphemistically of this condition as a
transition period. Familiarity with chaos has not bred
contempt so much as it has softened us to the point of
acceptance. We begin to hear poetry and see beauty in
accidents, randomness, chance, and silence.
"A poem need not have a meaning," said Wallace
Stevens, "and like most things in nature often does not
have a meaning." I quite agree with this statement. A
poem or any work of art may only stimulate a sense of
heightened awareness. And to do so, the work of art may
have to destroy the obvious. But the critic does need to
tell the artist and his public that art is not just a matter
of how much we destroy the obviousness of yesterday.
Art greatly depends on the artistic ability of man to
create a new poetry while destroying the old poetry
inherent in the obviousness of yesterday.
Man has made many new discoveries about himself
in this century and has displaced much of the obviousness of other ages. This has exacted a price in his art.
The groping for new forms in art participates in the end
of Modem, or Renaissance, man in our time, and that
groping has not yet subsided. Exploration, rationalization, and mechanization carried to triumph and saturation, there is not much left of the world to be cut, divided, and re-divided. Men have begun to tum against
themselves and, inevitably, the cosmos. Up "there" we
find that "there" is nowhere and everywhere, and our
art is led nowhere and everywhere. This influences our
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psyches as much as the ruptures of wars and revolutions
and our "progress" toward total mechanization in our
technology. The artist in particular has ever more difficulty in preserving his identity, but the rest of us, including the critics, are not far behind him.
It is almost tragicomic to see how man, in his hope
and distress, tries out his new faith. Samuel Beckett
found a most moving way to express it in Waiting for
Godot. The tramp, Vladimir, says to the messenger of
Godot - whoever he may be - in trembling breath:
"Tell him ... tell him you saw us. You did see us, didn't
you?" What else does it mean but that we want to be
recognized as human beings, not as numbers or the faceless faces of the masses? And in spite of the feeling of
futility the voice cries out from the dunghill: "Eli,
Eli, doth thou not see that I am, I am!"

The Decline of Tragedy
and the Darkening of Comedy
Pathos, absurdity, futility, and despair are not tragedy. One of the chief artistic losses of our time has been
the decline of tragedy. It cannot be easily determined
whether it is nobler to sum up man's plight through
laughter or through tears. But there are times when
comedy is the more natural theatrical expression , and
that time is now. Friedrich Duerrenmatt said: "The time
for tragedy is over. A disorganized world in which there
are no longer any established standards of guilt and personal responsibilities, in which we are powerless to resist the course of events bigger than ourselves, calls for
comedy - comedy not born of despair but of courage .
The world, as I see it, stands as something monstrous,
an enigma or calamity that has to be accepted but to
which there must be no surrender."
And Christopher Fry, who thought that "Comedy is
an escape, not from truth but from despair: a narrow
escape into faith," echoed Duerrenmatt with this final
passage in his essay of comedy: "There are times in the
state of man when comedy has a special worth, and the
present is one of them: a time when the loudest faith
has been faith in trampling materialism, when literature
has been thought unrealistic which did not mark and
remark our poverty and doom .... Laughter may seem
to be only the exhalation of air, but out of that air we
came; in the beginning we inhaled it; it is truth, not a
fantasy, a truth voluble of good which comedy stoutly
maintains."
What happened to tragedy on its way into the present
century? Its gradual demolition began with Hegel and
his dialectics, with Darwin's idea of natural selection
and the survival of the fittest, and with Ernst Haeckel's
revolutionary ideas about biology. We first get the clearest testimony to those influences in Ibsen's Ghosts. The
new concepts of heredity hit tragedy a severe blow. Fate
was now inherent in heredity and environment, and
the human struggle took on more and more mechanical
and scientific aspects.
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Marx furthered the thought of Hegel, "standing Hegelianism on its head," and further weakened the force
of tragedy . "The metaphysics of Christianity and Marxism," says George Steiner, "are anti-tragic." Next,
Freudianism was to render the grandeur of classic
tragedy's catharsis illusory. Oedipus now receiving the
first unsettling message of his doom makes an appointment with his psychiatrist. We can, many of us, be put
through catharsis under an analyst's supervision, and
the therapy of the dramatic imagination of the playwright becomes more or less obsolete.
Finally, I believe, it was Brecht in th~ twenties who
cleared the stage of much of tragedy. Here are some of
his commandments from his Hegeiian-Marxist Sinai:
Do not believe in the lie of inevitability. Do not identify
with the hero or heroine. Laugh about those who weep
on stage and weep about those who laugh. Be shocked
into awareness. Let the play convince you as if it were
a plea in court, and then make your verdict.
Take the examples of the nearest we have to tragic
figures in our time , Willy Loman in Arthur Miller's
Death of a Salesman and Anne Frank in The Diary of
Anne Frank. Neither Anne Frank nor Willy Loman
reach the tragic realization of what happened to them as did Oedipus, Hamlet, and Antigone. The tragic
realization is reduced to a sad experience, more pathetic than tragic. As Kenneth Tynan said: "Willy Loman's
catastrophe depends entirely on the fact that the company he works for has no pension scheme for its employees. What ultimately destroys Willy is economic injustice, which is curable, as the ills that plague Oedipus
are not. "
Anne Frank's fate makes us leave the theatre depressed that mankind has persecuted the Jews, from the
medieval tortures inflicted by the church to the methodical slaughter of the Nazi state. Anne Frank's death takes
on the symbolic meaning of fate, but the catharsis is
embodied in mass destiny, not in the destiny of one individual. We know her fate could and should have been
prevented. The fate of a multitude has replaced the
fate of magnitude.
Thus, in our transition period, comedy has nearly
replaced tragedy. It is a comedy which is very dark at
times. It may start with dead people on the stage as in
Duerrenmatt's The Physicists. Often we escape into
grotesque and sick humor because we know that, if we
only wanted to, we could change the source that creates
the very situation at which we laugh. The discrepancy
between the human genius which can materialize our
most daring dreams and the human inability to cope
with our simplest problems is at the root of our darkest
comedy and sickest humor. At times, we have only
clowns to entertain us as one world is crashing down
and the new world waits to be born.
Now that we are in the process - and are far advanced in it - of demolishing much of what Renaissance man has dreamt of and created, we need more
than ever before some blueprint of the future. The critic
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shares responsibility with the artist for pointing out the
signs of the future and for marking well the wreckers
who are also builders.
I don't believe that a few artists, however iconoclastic,
are to be blamed or praised for where we are now. There
are no isolated phenomena in history. Nevertheless,
certain artists have succeeded in numbing us or in convincing us with certain ideas which have found wider
expression in our time. The art of much of the sixties
was a popularization and extension of much that went
before it. For example, Alfred Jarry in his Ubu Roi
started the revolt against everything rational in the
theatre and has the dubious distinction of introducing
four-letter words on stage. Jarry influenced Apollinaire who introduced surrealism into the theatre before
and during World War I. Tristan Tzara raged dadaistically against the twenties and described his own play,
The Gas Heart, written in 1921, "as the biggest swindle
of the century in three acts." Three years later came
Andre Breton's surrealistic revolt against the crushing
of individual freedom and his drive toward the total
liberation of man's desires and imagination.
It was Jean Cocteau who was the first to create what I
call the cliche of the anti-cliche. That is, he was the first
to put a poetically heightened banality of reality on
stage. Pirandello taught us the indistinctness of reality
and illusion, of to be and to seem. Erik Satie taught us
to liberate art from adornment; Picasso to run faster
than beauty; Stravinsky to forsake and insult habit. In
the twenties Erwin Piscator and Bertolt Brecht fought
for the political and epic theatre. And James Joyce hammered out new images in the twenties and stammered
a new grammar and vocabulary.

A Hard Time for a Lover of Love
The avant-garde of the fifties and sixties, however,
stood on barricades erected in the twenties. We live now
in the most extreme extensions of revolutions begun
around World War I. We are close to obliterating the
distinctions of an earlier age between the arts themselves
as well as between art and life. The mixed or multimedia arts are only one phase of that obliteration. Recently
some engineers joined some dancers in New York and
tried to amalgamate their divergent disciplines in a far
more provocative way than the Bauhuas ever did! The
artistic result was not good, but that does not mean they
will not try again and perhaps do better. The innovation of the multimedia is fraught with traps, but also
with nearly limitless new possibilities.
Take a near example, the happenings attempted
several years ago. Here is an extreme of the trend toward spontaneity. The artist of the happening is more
interested in the way he does his thing than in its final
polished result, if any. A certain loosening of technique
goes hand in hand with daring attempts to wipe out
illusions, especially the separation of the audience and
the performer. The audience becomes a performer in
the work of art, not only in happenings but in more and
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more of the theatre of our time. To draw the spectator
actively into the action as an actor is to throw the theatre back to its initial state of being a communal ritual.
What is wrong with this development is the very fact
~hat the theatre came into being at that point where it
parted company with ritual. At the origins of theatre,
the chief creation was, in fact, the creation of spectators
out of worshippers. The new theatre with its desire for
audience participation wants to whip up yes-sayers, believers, co-worshippers. The result can only be a catharsis of puppets. This kind of theatre would be deprived
of some of the greatest assets which theatre has achieved:
stimulation, food-for-thought, enlightenment.
The contemporary artist may not know quite what
he wants, but he certainly knows what he dislikes: the
heavy hand of our super-mechanized and over-commercialized world. In saying no to it, he often shouts
so loud that we cannot hear what he is saying. Or he
bores us, and sometimes with malice and forethought,
he creates the art of nothingness to bore us intentionally.
Andy Warhol perfected boredom with his replica of the
Campbell soup can for a painting. And a yawn is about
the only critical comment one can give non-books with
unnumbered pages which the reader can shuffle like
cards and follow them in any sequence chance dictates.
Much of contemporary art gives the critics a hard
time. I am reminded of what Herman Hesse said of
criticism in 1918 when he faced the futurists, expressionists, and dadaists of his time. He decided to remain true
to himself and ignore the passing bandwagons, and he
thought the critic, too, should reject neither the old nor
the new, remaining true to himself as much as the artist.
Critics, he observed, have "a bitterly hard time of it.
But why shouldn't a critic have a hard time? That's
what they are there for."
As a critic I realize I am here to have a hard time. I
am trying not to reject the old nor the new. But I often
get desperate and nauseated when I must face art
created out of nausea and despair. On the one. hand, I
try to tell the artist that it is not enough to be against
one's time; one must also creatively react to it. And, on
the other hand, I try to tell the audiences that it is not
enough to be against the artists of one's time; one must
make an effort to understand one's time and its artists .
To understand does not necessarily mean to approve
and to accept. There have been critics as firm as artists
in their judgments as often as there have been critics
who have blindly followed every avant-garde to yessay it. I repeat, every age gets the art it deserves.
Perhaps we need now two different kinds of critics,
one for the traditional art and one for the new art. For
the traditional art you need your six senses and the
proper use of comparison and analysis. Facing the new
art, the critic may at best describe what he sees, because
much of the new art makes criticism obsolete. The critic
coming to some new spectacle may have to put his traditional tools under his seat, his intellect in his pockets,
and unwrap his emotions from yesterday's experiences.
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That can be all to the good. But the critic must also pick
up his tools again and, from time to time, point out that
the emperor has no clothes on, a nudity too literally
true of whole casts in some plays.
The critic needs enough agility to avoid getting run
over by a bandwagon often filled with curators, impresarios, press agents, barkers, and his fellow critics. He
also needs the intelligence and sympathy to find the
genuine artist who dares to look into the blushing and
bleeding face of his time for a creative expression of his
anguish and jubilation for being a part of it.
I can see some of the torment of many contemporary
artists. Many of their mental somersaults and just plain

hoaxes are the result of the realization that, after the
bomb, the traditional notion of posterity for the works
of any artist is most problematic. I understand the artist's need to react to it with doubt, grim laughter, in a
kidding mood, or even a nihilistic rage for chaos and
nothingness. He may well feel as Dylan Thomas felt
when he wrote: "Do not go gentle into that goodnight,
rage, rage .. .. "
I only wish more contemporary artists had the
strength of Thomas' poetry and his vision of despair. I
understand their hate of the world and even their
hatred for themselves. But they cannot make me love
their hate, since I cannot help loving love.

From the Chapel

Yes and No in a Taxicab
By WALTER R. BOUMAN
Associ•te Professor of Theology
Concordi• Te•chers College
River Forest, Illinois

This dialogue took place approximately as described.
Imagine a clergyman getting into a taxicab. The driver
throws the first words over his shoulder in the direction
of the clerical collar he glimpsed when the clergyman
got into the cab.
Driver: · Where to?
Clergyman: Airport, please.
D: You a priest or something?
C: I'm a Lutheran pastor.
D: That so? I used to go to a Lutheran church. St.
Paul's on the north side. Pastor X baptized my
kids. Know him?
C: Yes, I do.
D: Yeah? I liked him a lot, but I don't go much any
more. (Pause) You know, I got a theory about religion. All religions are OK if you practice them .
C: (Not interested) That so?
D: Yeah! Every religion is good so long as you put it
into practice.
C: (Suddenly deciding to take the conversation seriously) Could I test your theory?
D: ~ure, go ahead. Always like to talk about religion.
C: What would you say about Hitler and Nazism? Was
that a good religion?
D: (Surprised) That wasn't no religion!
C: But it had many of the characteristics of a religion
- rituals, doctrines, heretics. Most important,
Hitler demanded and got total loyalty and unquestioning obedience. The institutions of Nazism
replaced those of Christianity almost item by item.
What does that do to your theory that every religion is good so long as you put it into practice?
D: Well, you sure got a crazy definition of religion!
C: Howso?
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D:

Well, I always think of religion as, well, you know,
churches and praying and preaching and that stuff.
C: And if you don't go to church you're not very religious?
D: Well, you know, like I said, I sorta got away from it.
C: Maybe you did . Or maybe you just got away from a
churchly kind of religion. And maybe religion
could include a lot more than church. For example,
what are you loyal to? What do you care about?
D: Lots of things - like bowling. I sure like to bowl,
twice a week. Pretty good average, too. 169. You
bowl?
C: A little. But is bowling the most important thing
in the world for you? Does it have your highest
loyalty? Would you do anything to bowl?
D: No, guess not. It's not important like that.
C: What is?
D: I guess- well, my kids, maybe. They're pretty important. Even got me to go to church for a while you know, St. Paul's. That's how much I'd do for
them! One's in college now. That's why I drive a
cab a couple a nights a week - and weekends. I
need the money for the kids - though I got a good
enough regular job - at MacDonald, right out
where we're going.
C: You'd do anything for your kids?
I guess so. Anything. My boy- the one in college,
you know - studying engineering - he'll be
drafted when he's done. Another year. Way it looks,
he'll probably go to VietNam. I think I'd go for
him if I could. I was in the last war, you know.
Germany.
C: That so?
D: Yeah. Guess I'd do anything. Wife says I care too

D:
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C:
D:

C:
D:

C:
D:

C:

D:
C:
D:
C:
D:
C:

D:

C:

much. But what else a man got to live for. No, take
my kids away and I don't care anymore.
Sounds like that's you're religion.
I thought you were gonna say that. I sorta knew
what you were driving at way back when you asked
what I cared about. Tried to change the subject
'cause I know what you're gonna say. You're gonna
say I worship my kids - just like the wife says.
Well do you?
Aw right. Lemme tell you. Yeah! I do. And it
bothers me. I used to go into their rooms at night
when they were little - and they'd be sleeping and I'd love them so much I could just feel it. And
I knew I couldn't stand to have them suffer, and
when they were sick it was worse on me than it was
on them. I knew if one of 'em died it would be awful. I knew I couldn't stand it. I would even pray
once in a while, that God wouldn't let 'em die . I
thought going to church might help. But then
there didn't really seem to be a God. 'Scuse me,
reverend. I don't mean to insult you.
That's OK. Go ahead.
Finally it just seemed useless, all that singing and
praying and sitting and standing. Mind you, I'm
not against religion . Good for the kids to get some
starch into their lives, something to keep 'em
straight.
But I knew that if something was going to happen to 'em, it would. Nothing I could do. So what
the hell - 'scuse me, reverend. You got me going
here. I went to church often enough to please 'em
till I got this weekend taxi job. They knew I was
working for them. Keep 'em safe. Keep 'em straight.
Give 'em a good education. That's all I can do. Till
they get drafted and get sent to VietNam. And get
shot to hell. And me with 'em. I know that's the way
it will be. And I don't know what to do. What do I
do? And don't tell me to believe in God. That don't
work. I tried.
I'm not going to talk to you about God ; but we can
talk about religion because you have a religion,
and you're practicing it right now. Driving this
cab. You don't have to believe there is a God because you already have a god : your kids. I could
say even more. You use your kids to justify your
life. That's what keeps you working and living.
Well, what's wrong with that?
Why don't you tell me?
Oh hell! Don't play games with me.
I'm not; really, I'm not. I think you already told
me what's wrong.
When?
When you talked about how you loved your kids
and ended up thinking of one of them dead, maybe
in a war, and you not able to do anything about it.
I still don't get it.
Look, the point you yourself are making is that
you have a god, something that says YES to you,
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something that justifies your existence. Everybody
who goes on living has made or found that kind of
YES for life. That's why Camus ...
D : Who?
C: Camus, Albert Camus.
D: Never heard of him.
C: That's all right. The point is, he said that suicide
was the only important philosophical problem. If
we go on living it's because we have a ~od, a YES,
something that affirms us.
The thing you are beginning to realize is that
your YES isn't all that dependable. You can't count
on your kids being what you've asked them to be:
your "god." That's the trouble with all our religions, all our "gods," all our causes and affirmations. They are not God. They are not able to be
what we make them. We have to work overtime to
pump "life" into our "gods." That's what enslaves
us, finally. Our home-made gods always demand
more than they can deliver.
D: But my kids are good to me. Couldn't ask for more.
C: Sure they are. But they can't be the whole ball of
wax. And they won't be either. It's not just Viet
Nam. They grow up, marry, move away from
home. They need us less and less.
D: Yeah, that's happening already.
C: Besides, none of us ever succeeds in justifying our
lives - even if our "gods" outlast us. Death says a
final NO to everyone of us.
D: Wait a minute! I don't look at death like that. It's
just, when your number is up, you've bought it.
C: I'm not talking about how we look at death; I'm
talking about the fact of death. Some people are
saying that "God is dead." It may really be that
death is God, that death is the inescapable verdict
upon each of us.
D: You make it sound like I'm guilty of somethin~.
But I don't feel guilty. Nothing wrong with lovin~
your kids.
C: Right - not if that's all you're doing. But if lovin~
them is the way you justify what you are and what
you do, then you are already living an evaluated
life. And then death, too, is an evaluation. It says
NO.
D: That's pretty hard to take. I didn't ask to be born. I
didn't ask to be made this way.
C: That's part of my point. When we can't justify ourselves, we can always try to blame something, or
someone, or the system itself. Anything to make
sure that we are never in the wrong.
D: Say, aren't you preachers supposed to comfort people? None of this sounds very comforting.
C: Well, we started talking about religion, remember?
Trying to test your theory that all religions are
good as long as you practice them. I've tried to say
that we all have a religion, a way of getting a YES
for life, a way of not being in the wrong. And it
seems to me that our religions really fail us, that
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we are betrayed by our religions into deceiving
ourselves and blaming others. The verdict on that
kind of living is death.
D: But you didn't say anything about God.
C: You said you didn't want to be told about God. So
we talked about life and failure and the verdict of
death. That may be all the glimpse we get of God
from life and history. And the God we see there is
not some grandfatherly being who makes everything come out all right in the end. You yourself
said that there didn't seem to be that kind of God
anyway. The only God we're likely to meet if we
look for one in life and history is the God that says
NO to life and history.
D: But aren't you supposed to tell us a way out?
C: I don't think so. Whatever else I might have to say,
it's not a way out. Christianity is not some cheap
escape from the way things are. You can invent an
escape if you want, but it won 't take you anywhere .
You can even try to make the Christian Gospel into
some kind of escape, but that's as much an invented
religion as any other - and just as much a failure.
D: Well, what is Jesus supposed to do?
C: He doesn't let us off. He lets us in on Himself, on
what He is and on what He does. He is YES to us ,
and He asks us to believe that and to give up our
other "gods" and justifications. His best known
stories were about Himself, because he was accused
of saying YES to people who didn't have much
going for them socially or morally or religiously whores and traitors. He told about a son who took
his inheritance and left home . ..
D: Yeah, yeah, I know. "Prodigal son." Right?
C: The point of th~ story is that Jesus is a different
way of dealing with rejected people. We might call
it "forgivene~s," but it does not come cheap. Jesus'
death is His final and total commitment to us . It is
the way He experiences the verdict, lets it happen
to him, our home-made religions and our illusory
justifications.
The boy in Jesus' story gets that kind of YES
which sets him free to admit that he is in the wrong.
We are given that YES in Jesus which sets us free to
say NO to our religions, even to join in the verdict
upon them because the YES is stronger than the
verdict, because when the verdict has done its
worst, the YES overcomes it.
D: I never heard it that way before.
C: But that's what Christians mean by "Gospel." To
believe that Gospel means to entrust ourselves to
the YES in Jesus, to hold to that YES against the
NO of life in history. To believe Jesus is to be free
for all the things in the world out of which we want
to make gods- for bowling and kids and work and
the wife. We are really free for them because we
don't need any longer to try to make them what
they can't be: our "gods." We're not trapped into
working them up into something "divine." We're
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D:
C:

D:
C:

D:

free to be for them as Jesus is for us.
Well, where does church and praying fit into all
this?
It helps if we stop thinking first that church is a
building or a religious organization. Church is
really what happens to people when the Gospel is
happening to them and through them to other
people. The words that Christians share with one
another about Jesus as God the forgiver are meant
to set them free for one another and for all men.
Doesn't sound like any church I know.
Maybe we all have to ask where this is really going
on. It's true that a lot of religious action going on
under the name of church is only a cover-up for
our old home-made religions. A German play
written right after World War II is about a man
who comes back from the war and finds himself
betrayed by everything. The church is a character
called "god" in the play. The character keeps repeating, "Nobody cares about me anymore." That's
what a lot of "churches" ask for - that people care
about them . But the author shouts, "Hasn't God
studied theology? Who is supposed to care about
whom?"
When the church cares about itself and worries
about whether people care about it, then that's a
sure sign that the Gospel is being missed somewhere. The Gospel sets people free from wonderingwho cares about them, sets them free for caring.
You mean even church religions aren't all right
when you practice them?

C:

I'm saying that churches and doctrines and even
the Bible can be misused so that they become
"gods" and false gospels. Right religion is where
Jesus' affirmation is being heard and trusted and
celebrated so that men are free for each other.
Wrong religion is not trusting the Gospel that is in
Jesus - and that kind of religion can be going on
in the middle of churches.
D : Does praying do any good?
C:

Like everything else, that depends on whether
praying grows out of trusting the good news in
Jesus. When you believe the good news, you can
hold your whole life and the people in it; your
world and its destiny, before God. Praying then
means getting to be a "son of God" like Jesus, that
is, knowing and trusting and saying thanks for the
YES that sets you free. Then you will recognize
God's YES elsewhere in the world, and you will
look for ways to be part of the YES in the world .. . .
This the airport?

D:

Yeah.

C:

Here. Keep the change.

D : Thanks. If you ever see Pastor X, tell him hello.
C:

But I didn't get your name.

D:

That's all right. Just tell him about me. He'll know.
The Cresset

Music

I'm All Ears
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - B Y WILLIAM F. EIFRIG, JR.

The beginning of a new year is always a good time
for making up with those we have injured and resolving
to see the good in everyman. Fortunately for us a year
has several beginnings. More than once, in the midst of
one cycle of days that have seen resolutions weaken and
wounds again opened, a new cycle begins. The Church
year, the calendar year, the Jewish year, the Chinese
year, and of course the fiscal year: a New Year's celebration at least every quarter. But January 1 is the day before all days for good intentions. So I take this opportunity to say a good word for the composers of electronic music and I mark the other New Year's days in my
diary to reproach me for negligence in my intentions to
think well of these men.
My public avowal that electronic music is no longer
my artistic enemy signifies neither a capitulation to a
superior force nor a conversion to a new musical credo.
This reconciliation results from an intuition of auditory
honesty and confirms the harmonious coexistence of
stylistic plurality and artistic integrity. I can listen more
appreciatively to electronic music now that my question
"Why?" has found an answer.
I suppose for many composers who work in the medium the equipment for producing and reproducing
electronic sounds itself provides the challenge and the
fascination. We all like toys. Artistic instruments are at
best sublime playthings. Organists, violinists, pianists,
conductors, and probably every performer plays some
pieces for no other reason than that they are fun to realize on the instrument. Few composers have resisted the
urge to see what the thing can do . The man who glows
with excitement over voltage snaps and tones produced
by a sequencer and put through a ring modulator with
envelope filter continues the tradition of Biber's retuned
violin, Berlioz' flute-trombone dialogue, and Liszt's
keyboard deceptions.
If this were all, however, electronic synthesizers and
systems were merely Christmas toys for the man who
already has had a gyroscope and an electric train. The
invention of electronic pieces were a harmless, if expensive, pastime for the composer and hearing them questionable idleness for the listener.

The artist is not gadgeteer. If society requires artists ,
it is not because it has no mechanics or knows not what
to do with its leisure. The artist, professional or not , is
the man whose sensibilities create for us new apprehensions of reality. By his guidance we perceive our world
as if the five senses had been given to us just then. When
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we see as we have never seen before and hear as we have
never heard, then we thank God that unto some is ~ivcn
the gift of artistry. The composer is the priest of our
sonorous world.
That world is filled with sounds reproduced electronically, amplified, and broadcast through speakers.
Electronic sounds surround us at market and at table.
We are spoken to by disembodied voices as often as we
converse in the flesh. Audible signals are no lon!!.·er
clanging metals or wheezing steam; they are bleepers
and wowers. Before Marconi and Edison the substitute
for a symphony concert was piano four-hand arran~e
ments. When the opera was out of season or too expensive, favorite arias were learned on the parlor piano.
With radio and recordings the orchestra came into our
homes ar.d we had an opera or two on the shelf. We have
come almost to think the concert hall archaic, the studio
sufficient, and are alarmed to find the sounds of actual
performance strangely wrong in our ears. The recording technician has replaced the composer and the performer.
Those who have ears to hear are conscious of the
acoustic frauds perpetrated and will not tolerate the
musical deprivations visited upon audiences unaware.
Better never to have heard the fulness of a fine violin's
tone than to grow up thinking the reproduction adequate. (Better never to have butter than to be persuaded
the lower priced spread is just the same.) The custodians of our sense of hearing suggest another use of our
phonographs and radios: listen to the best sounds these
can produce. Not reproductions but realization.
Last night I heard on a single program conventional
instruments as well as synthesized pieces. The sounds
were immediate, fresh, real, and compatible. Had I
been at home listening to the pair of speakers in the
living room I should have preferred the honest sounds
of the synthesizer to the carbon copies of the instruments. Make the experiment yourself: notice that the
electronic music of some TV commercials and programs
is a better sound than the dreadful noises purportin~
to be an orchestra.
Of course, I may prefer the black and white reproductions of Beethoven or Verdi I have at home to most
electronic compositions. The profundities of the former
survive distortion; the latter is too often arcane cerebration or wall-paper music. But you have my ears,
gentlemen; I'm listening for anything you have to say.
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The Mass Media

The Pornography Report

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------By RICHARD LEE
The Lockhart report on obscenity and pornography,•
sidling up spine to spine with the Warren, Kerner,
Walker, Eisenhower, and Scranton reports, inches Americans closer to a one-foot shelf documenting their worries. While the report itself (p. 188) suggests that pornography is the very least of worries for most Americans, it might yet get as wide a reading as the earlier
reports if its heated denunciation in Washington arouses
as much interest in it as a banning in Boston used to
give a book.
When the report was submitted before the elections
last fall, speed readers (I assume) among our public
servants fairly fell over themselves to attack it. The
report was instantly labeled "liberal," "permissive,"
"malicious or misguided or both." The commisioners
were charged with "decadence" and rewarded for their
pains with at least one threat of a congressional investigation. After his staff dispatched a writer to help the
wording of dissents with which he could identify, the
president condemned the majority report as "morally
bankrupt. " His own appointee to the commission, the
author of the longest (122 pp.) and most vividly documented dissent, even obtained_an injunction, later lifted, to bar the publication of the majority report. All in
all last fall , an ordinary citizen could believe that the
pornography report were pornographic.
Now that the season for political and professional
football is recessed, perhaps the Lockhart report can be
read more dispassionately, indeed read at all and at
last.
There is likely no way one can discuss pornography
without offending someone's taste or morality in some
delicacy or without exposing himself to some suspicion
of a moral or spiritual flaw in his character. While one
may be troubled up to the brink of a gloomy preoccupation with the many profitable inhumanities of the
American way of life which he personally considers pornographic, the present public discussion of pornography
wrenches him around to talking about "explicit sexual
materials." Ho-hum.
However, for what it's worth, my view is that "explicit sexual materials," like much else, can be pornographic. When they are, I find them loveless, joyless,
antisex, mercurially boring, and (my puritanism) a
cheat of time and money. M y own lay observation is
that the usual end of that pornography, personally considered, is to leave its consumers in their own stupor,
*The R eport of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography. The
Text with Dissents. Introduction by Clive Barnes. (New York: Bantam ,
1970 ) 700 pp. $1 .65 paper.
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isolation, fear, and passivity. The same pornography,
socially considered, only seems to me to entrench more
stoutly still that misnamed and surely Godless "puritanism" which believes sex itself to be somewhat unnatural or only natural.
To my mind this is particularly true for that pornography in films and, to a little lesser degree, plays. "Explicit" sex in poems and novels, however descriptive,
can never be fully explicit and seems to admit more personal fantasy. The stage and the film, with their greater
command of the actualities, can trap the consumer of
pornography more wretchedly in someone else's guile.
For him or her, I suppose, better a thousand words than
one picture. For the rest of us , tender play and repose
with our beloveds makes all "explicit sexual materials" which are pornographic seem very sad.
Back to the Lockhart report. The "common sense"
meaning of pornography in America being "explicit
sexual materials," and there being a most fearful lore
linking them to all evils imaginable, the most utterly
rejected parts of the report will long remain one of its
conclusions and one of its recommendations.
The conclusion: Extensive empirical investigation,
both by the commission and by others, provides no
evidence that exposure to or use of explicit sexual materials play a significant role in the causation of social
or individual harms such as crime, delinquency, sexual or nonsexual deviancy, or severe emotional disturbances. (p. 58)
The recommendation. Federal, state, and local legislation should not seek to interfere with the right of
adults who wish to do so to read, obtain, or view explicit sexual materials. (p. 57)
No one need hope (nor fear) that this recommendation will soon affect the laws at issue in its direction.
The recommendation, for all its legal wisdom in restricting law to its proper business, goes against the bills
now mounting in various legislatures to inflate, not
circumscribe, pornography laws. More basically, the
recommendation goes against the lore and intuitions
of the majority of Americans. I can yet recall a Sunday
school class when my saintly teacher gave me, along
with my memory verses on that then puzzling sixth
(in the Lutheran reckoning) commandment, an even
more puzzling tract which related alchohol to what
must have been pornography in those days, "a poison
which burns the head and heart as its cousin does the
stomach."
Earlier commissions recommended actions on social
issues which most Americans, way deep down, believed
to be virtues. The plight of the recommendation above is
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that it must surely seem to most Americans to be urging vice. If action on the recommendations of earlier
commissions has been lacking passion, we need not be
curious about the future of this recommendation .
Which brings me to what interests me. I fear I have
been unable to hide my scant interest in the pornography issue, but I hop~ I have not excluded the possibility that others, wiser and less innocent than I , might
be properly concerned. I believe, perhaps too simply,
that Jesus spoke the philisophia perennis best on the
morality, if not also on the taste, of the matter when he
observed that it was not what goes into a man but what
comes out of him that defiles him. What interests me is
the fate of reports of federal commissions which make
sane recommendations which go against the lore and
intuitions of a majority of Americans.
In the crunch, of course, the research is rejected with
the recommendations (The senate in its competence
judged the Lockhart report "unscientific.") and social
science is freshly damned (Remember when it was chid-

ed for telling us what every schoolboy knows is "common sense"?). And we go on trying to govern ourselves
and others, if hypocritically, by those "superstitions"
Mark Twain said he would rather make for any nation
that all its laws and songs together.
Since it is my belief (intuition?) that some of our social strains require solutions which may counter the
intuitions and lore (guaranteed annual income, ecological restraints on "productivity," etc.) of the majority
of Americans, I am more concerned about the gap between the popular will and what (we think) we know by
the labors of social science. The popular will, I hope
it goes without saying, should prevail, and research and
recommendations from the social sciences, however
outrageously they counter the lore and intuitions of the
majority, should go on advancing into its jaws. However, a few social scientists, among others, might well
study that gap itself and recommend ways it might be
overcome more quickly.
But, please, not a federal commission report on what
to do with federal commission reports.

Terror
But guilt, bondage, suffering, and death remain
problems for every man, and their terror is often
heightened by the processes of social change.
-David Baily Harned, in The Virginia Quarterly
Review
I do not suffer from the dark this year so much.
We have spotlights taking care
of the (roughly) four corners of the house,
and the trees have been thinned out.
Also, Harriet, my wife, has taken to reading,
and therefore often goes to sleep by herself.
Sex (let me be quite frank) is a sort of bondage.
Magazines look more and more like manifestoes.
The most recent sermon I heard was at Christmas,
with a striking line,
and I wish I could recall whose:
"We are condemned to be free."
It is really too pithy to stand alone,
and so I toned it down
in a paragraph for the company newsletter.
Sexually, this means you have to try everything.
I was beginning to think
that suffering went out with the ice wagon,
until my tooth started hurting last week.
Now I find I need a root canal.
Ruth, my daughter, is always talking
about the suffering of the poor.
She is in college, of course, where they hear those things,
and while they are true, they are only half the truth.
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No, I am not going to be guilty
of glibly dismissing the world's problems.
In a broad sense we are all guilty of failing to do enough.
We taught her, my wife and I, to be sensitive.
Arid so if she is sensitive, we, of course, are responsible,
and it is a good thing.
I do feel guilty sometimes
about not having learned to like novels.
My wife tells me what I am missing,
but even on television one of those hour-long plays
is quite a bit to take.
We bought our cemetery plot just in time.
This area of the county is expanding so,
that more people are dying, and the available space
(at least in the '::stablished cemeteries)
is going fast.
The new memorial parks just do not suit me.
I don't like the emphasis on statuary and the idea
that the grave marker
should be flush with the ground.
Although, on the other hand,
you get a feeling of openness as opposed to clutter.
I never visualized dying as either open or closed,
and maybe not even much of a change.
I think it might be more peaceful less of the criminal element, teeth hurting, and people
so terribly anxious to turn
things inside out generally.

CHARLES VANDERSEE
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Political Affairs

The Passing of a Nation Statesman
----------------------------------------------------------------------------By ALBERT A. TROST

"General de Gaulle is dead. France is a widow." With
trembling voice, President Pompidou delivered this
message to the French people on the morning of November 10, 1970.
President Pompidou's characterization of Charles
de Gaulle may be only a very slight exaggeration. No
leader in the post-World War II world has been so
closely tied to the fate of a national political community as was de Gaulle with France immediately after
World War II and with Fifth Republic France for a
decade after 1958. He came to power both times in the
wake of discredited governments and discredited constitutions. Not only did the personnel of French government have little stature in the eyes of the citizens in these
periods of crisis, but the institutions of government did
not command widespread legitimacy. Especially in
1958, de Gaulle personally commanded enough legitimacy to permit a stable transition to new constitutional
government.
De Gaulle's most outstanding- contribution as the
"husband" of France may turn out to be the Constitution
of the Fifth Republic. Outside of a Gaullist movement
that faded after several years, he left no lasting institutional legacy to France after his tenure as provisional
head of government in 1946. However, in 1958 he took
a personal role in drafting the present constitution. At
first, the judgement of journalists and political scientists was that the Fifth Republic's legitimacy and stability were too dependent upon de Gaulle's charisma.
When de Gaulle was no longer President, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic would also go. De Gaulle
stepped down in 1969 and the constitution survived under President Pompidou. If it survives the immediate
memory of de Gaulle and another generation of leadership, France may have a possession that has often eluded
her, a legitimate institutional arrangement that is capable of bringing stability to the government.
De Gaulle's intimate association with the nation also
has a significance that elevates his importance in world
history beyond that attached to two-time "national
saviors." He may be the last of a group of leaders of
world powers who vigorously espouse the cause of the
nation-state as the best of the political communities
which man has designed for himself. He saw the nationstate in traditional terms as a group of people with common language and common culture. The post-World
War II world could finally only find the peace and
security it wanted in a world of nations. The world
would benefit by a strong, independent, and self-confident France, and also by an independent Algeria,
Guinea, and Ivory Coast.
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From the view-point of the world outside France, particularly the Western industrialized world, de Gaulle's
advocacy of this nationalism had both good and bad
effects. His nationalism led him to grant self-determination and finally independence to French possessions
in Africa. Since France, along with the United Kingdom,
held most of Africa as colonial possessions, this action
dealt a fatal blow to colonialism in its last outpost.
De Gaulle put Portugal and Spain in very untenable
positions as the remaining old colonial powers.
The espousal of national self-determination, however, also led de Gaulle to more regressive policies. He
defended the concept of national communities against
the advocates of supranationalism in both the European
Community and the United Nations. He defended
national independence against the intrusion of alliances, especially those like NATO which were dominated by one nation. He argued against the rigid structure of a bi-polar distribution of power in the world
and proposed in its place a return to the balance of
power distribution of pre-1940 Europe.
The behavior of France in the United Nations, particularly in her defense of the concept of national jurisdiction against U.N. intervention, has not been decisive
in that organization. In the European Economic Community (the Common Market), however, de Gaulle's
action in defense of national sovereignty, particularly
France's, probably blocked the steady progress of that
organization in its movement toward more supranational power. In 1965, France vetoed the movement of
the E.E.C. toward its final stage when the Commission
of the Common Market could make decisions binding
all member nations to them.
To many in Europe and the United States and Canada, de Gaulle's actions seemed to indicate that he had
not learned the lessons of World War II with regard to
the evils of nationalism. To these people de Gaulle
stood against peace and prosperity in Europe, and that
was unforgivable.
It does seem to be the case that new forms of human
communities, other than the nation-state, may improve
the prospects of individuals to realize happiness. Defense of the nation-state, especially by a nation as large
as France and led by a man with the stature and singleminded dedication of Charles de Gaulle, can be an
effective obstacle to such innovation. Some comfort
might be taken in the fact that this man is probably the
last of this breed. However, one could well wish that
more national leaders were characterized by the humanitarian moral purposes and the intelligence that so clearly were attributes of de Gaulle.
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Education

A Future for Parochial Education
By STEPHEN A. SCHMIDT

The strategy of mainline Protestant religious education has remained virtually unchanged since the formation of the public school system during the latter half of
the nineteenth century. American Protestants then
supported the free public school system for several reasons: They recognized the need for cultural indoctrination; they saw the importance of uniform values; they
were committed to an educated citizenry; they viewed
the public school as the educational agency of Protestant
Christianity. The development of the Sunday school
gradually supplemented the public school as individual
denominational efforts were needed to amplify particular aspects of formal religious training. Protestant educational strategy has been the public school plus Sunday
school.
Other Christians responded differently to the task of
education for their young. The American Catholic and
some Lutheran experiences reflect a non-Protestant
strategy. Both groups adopted a parochial education
system. Their reasons were mixed. In part, they desired
ethnic and cultural solidarity, and they often sought
security in many old world values. Strong parish ties
created enclaves where they attempted the formation of
their young. They believed they were good Americans
and certainly Christians. Was it wrong to be a GermanAmerican or Irish-American? Their answer was a strong
affirmation of their identity as Christians and ethnicAmericans.
There were problems in both strategies - in the
Protestant compromise and in the parochial triangle of
home, church, and school. Robert Lynn outlines the
Protestant dilemma in his perceptive work Protestant
Strategies in Education. The strategy weakened on two
fronts. First, the meaning of the "public" in public education changed. There was less and less a single "public." "Public" is in fact now "pluralistic." The dominance of Protestantism in our culture declined, and the
public school no longer belonged to Protestants. The
second weakening of the Protestant strategy has been
the massive failure of the American Sunday school.
Abundant evidence indicates that the Protestant Sunday
school is not doing a successful job for Protestant Christianity.
Parochial education, too, is in crisis. Today Catholic
and Lutheran parochial schools struggle for existence.
Part of their struggle for existence must include a fresh
look at the content of the curriculum. Parochial education, both in the schools and in the congregations, has
often managed to separate Christians from much of
life. Many Lutherans live out large parts of their lives
unaware of the public world. Reality for many is the
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home, the parochial school, the church, and "churchy"
work. Some have lived apolitical lives and sometimes
politically reactionary lives.
The problem of parochial education is not the place
of education. It is sound practice to educate in a close
community. Parochial schools need more, rather than
less, support from the home and congregation. That full
parish life, for whatever else it is, represents a close
community of persons with reasonably unified values.
We need to maintain a pluralism of such sub-cultures
because each sub-culture is potentially a place of intimate community. There is no better place for education
than in the unity of home, church, and school - the
synthesis of parochial education.
To maintain the parochial strategy in the seventies
will require large sums of money. Some of this financial
support is possibly forthcoming in the form of an educational voucher plan which helps parents finance their
choice of the school - public, private, or parochial for their children. Recent data indicate that nearly 50%
of the American people would support such a plan for
the distribution of the tax monies raised for education.
Blacks, other minorities, and fearful whites all will
demand more local control of education. The voucher
plan is one way to put more control in the most responsible social unit, the family. We may see some realignment of public education and the development of a
pluralistic system of schools tied to more intimate subcultures. Parochial education fits into that pattern very
well.
Meanwhile, the content of the curriculum still needs
to be modified. Even now we could use a concentrated
political training within parish sub-cultures at the intensity appropriate to each age level, from the adults
to the children. More Christians need to be informed
about the political structures of their communities and
be equipped to work on these structures. We need parish
courses in community politics, methods of persuasion,
and the use of power. Adult classes might deal with
such topics as community control, creating consensus,
and common action on the urgent problems of their
community.
The curriculum must include the training of Christians politically so they can help form a "public" where
humane values can emerge and justice can be more
closely approximated than is the case in most of our
communities. The transformation of our communities
can be the "subversive" act of politically educated Christians, and part of our curriculum must be their political
education in the sub-culture of the home, church, and
school - the parochial synthesis with a difference.
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Books of the Month

Paper on Celluloid: Books on Movies

Higgledy-piggledy
Films are conversable,
Groovy in groves of avant academe.
Pros lens bare derrieres in
Freeze-double focus. then
Ink their more printable
Views on the theme.
Dating and researching movies correctly
is all the rage. A torrent of historical research
and the rescue of old prints have upset the old
cliches about film history and , unfortunately .
produced new ones.
Like many other aesthetic movements , the
film-book boom derives from the French, at
the usual respectful distance of a decade.
In Anglo-Saxon criticism and scholarship .
the sixties were the time of the popularization
of French ideas and attitudes from the fifties .
especially Bazin , Chabrol, Godard , and Ca-

hiers du Cinema -Nouvelle Vague.
The British establishment critics on Sight
and Sound stoutly resisted the French insistence on career-studies and then buckled and
brought out books around French heroes and
ideas. See the directors and ideas discussed
in Eric Rhodes 's Tower of Babel (1966),
John R . Taylor's Cinema Eye, Cinema Ear
( 1964). and Penelope's Houston 's Contemporary Cinema (1963).
The French then changed certain film
assumptions of American intellectuals by
i~norin~ them . These assumptions of our
intl'!lectuals had been aroused by our movies'
wouing existence as a mass medium . (Despite common belief, films are not generically a mass medium any more than novels or
classical verse tragedies. It is arguable that a
Dickens family novel or Sophoclean tragedy
requires a group reaction more than anything
shot by Griffith or Hawks .)
American cineastes from the thirties through
the fifties cast Hollywood studios as the villains opposing puris~ theoretical development.
The independent producers like McLaren ,
Flaherty. Chaplin , and all independent experimentalists were their heroes. Even technical skill was suspect, for it might lead to
the blandishments of Mayer and Zanuck, seven-year contracts, and movies with plots. Hollywood has a tendency toward genre-development - gangster. farce , western , polite comedy. "women's picture,' operetta - and
American intellectuals took a dim view of
such genres. It's no matter whether the categories were developed in the commercial theatre or are traditional literary forms like
the ballade, carol, and elegy.
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According to older American intellectuals,
virtue is the eruption of talent from the straitjacket of artistic convention and commercialism . (It will be noticed that this is predominantly a moral or political belief which preferably co-exists with much ignorance about
the real history of art.) If a studio workman
is talented , then he is " frustrated" like John
Ford at having to direct westerns or like Buster Keaton at having to act in farces . Once a
director becomes fashionable , it is discourteous to note that he is directing genre pictures . Antonioni's three pictures with Monica
Vitti are , after all, "women 's pictures" of the
1935 Hollywood type made with Garbo , Hepburn, Shearer, and Crawford .
The most famous single book of the older
American intellectual film criticism itself
acts out a melodrama. In Lillian Ross' Picture (1952) , John Huston struggles to film
Stephen Crane's novel against the commercial forebodings (q uite justified) of the evil
Mayer and Schenck. At the climax Miss Ross
contrasts her hero 's noble though studiobattered print with a safe commercial product,
Gene Kelly's Singing in the Rain. What the
French and later American critics pointed out
was the fact that Kelly's picture was better
than Huston's. The films and film books of
the sixties record the gradual adjustment of
the American intelligentsia to facts like these.
Cahiers du Cinema was begun in the early
fifties by Parisian intellectuals who had no
ideological bias against technical competence. They found the mass audience's preference for Hollywood studio products reasonable and critically perceptive. Especially,
at that time , the justified preference for Hitchcock's melodramas , the MGM dance musicals, and the numerous westerns released in
the fifties . Possibl y beyond the call of duty
the French also paid enough attention to all
of Jerry Lewis' Paramount farces to notice
his gradual development as an auteur. Henri
Langlois made Paris, with Moscow , one of
the great film-print centers in the world. He
let the Cahiers kids study his collection and
play games with the projector. French government laws opened the theatres for tyros to
produce and distribute their practice shorts .
At first our film critics in America could
not keep up . Some people are now aware that
Buster Keaton is inconspicuous in Lewis
Jacobs' Rise of the American Film ( 1939 )
which the author tried to make definitive and
exhaustive. These same people likely also
own Arthur Knight's attempt at an overall
film history. The Liveliest Art (1957). Yet
Knight not only borrows from Jacobs' primary
scholarship , even his phrases , but, less ex-

cus~bly, ma'.kes the same error of omitting any
emphasis on the important American films
of the previous decade because of his genre
prejudice. Knight underplays the forties'
musicals and melodramas just as Jacobs undervalued farces in the twenties not shot by
Charlie Chaplin .

Cahiers du Cinema - Nouvelle Vague
But 1957 marked the turning point. Eric
Rohmer and Claude Chabrol published Hitchcock for an Editions du Cerf series - a year
before Chabrol broke into feature production
and marked the official beginning of the

Nouvelle Vague.
(Let me digress to straighten out the confusion of Nouvelle Vague and Cahiers. This is
probably hopeless. Nouvelle Vague was first
a political term applied to supporters of Mendes-France. After DeGaulle's rise, the term
was taken up for other purposes. When several do ~en "first film s" were shot in Paris
in the early sixties, Nouvelle Vague was tied
to Truffaut, Godard , Chabrol, and others of
Cahiers who were self-educated on movies .
It was also tied to a separate university-trained group of film-makers led by Alain Resnais and Agnes Varda.)
(Among other distinctions , the ResnaisVarda group was politically more leftwing.
Cahiers tended to subvert leftist political
ideas and ignore the artistic dogmas of the
early histories of the film, like Paul Rotha's.
Recently , however , Godarc! has gone extreme
left, and his emotional identification lies with
the international graduate-student body
which provides both his audience and subject matter. )
(Excellent statistics on the 1960 production
explosion appear in Raymond Durgnat's monograph , Nouvelle Vague ( 1963 ), but he calls
nearly everybody in sight "N.Y. " The artistic and political ideologies of the film-makers
mentioned cannot be lumped so simply together. For example, I think Pierre Etaix is
the most interesting contemporary film-maker
because he tries to revive Keaton and Laurel
in a contemporary form . But Etaix is not
"N .Y." in any discussable way .)
Back to Rohmer and Chabrol. They began
with the suspect presupposition of the importance of Hitchcock's childhood schooling by
Jesuits. (Probably this was less important
for his films than his adult engineering
courses.) But Rohmer and Chabrol developed the standard modern interpretation of
Hitchcock - the transfer of guilt theme in
his films . More importantly, they demonstrated that a Hollywood-studio technician
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could work out private themes in his films
and develop an ouevre.
Yet they were also relaxed enough to observe the practical calculations behind Hitchcock's British films of the thirties. These
films were what older critics considered his
"purist" or "pre-sellout" pictures. The Frenchmen. however, argued that Hitchcock's two
1936 films based on Maugham-Conrad sources
were intended to show Hollywood moneymen
that he could handle "big-name" material and
was ready for A-budget American films. Rohmer and Chabrol distinguish the A-budget
(Selznick) from the B-budget (Universal)
pictures without letting this distinction affect their value judgment.
Also in 1957, the November issue of Commentary ran a subversive article by the art
critic, Manny Farber. Farber invented the
term "underground film." The expression was
later taken over by our experimental filmmakers, but Farber meant an entirely different set of movies. His article concerns the
medium-budget action-film directors like
Howard Hawks, Anthony Mann, and the preOscar John Ford. These directors kept to
their cost sheets, used semi-known contract
players, and relied on the studios for quick ,
mass distribution. "Underground" to Farber
meant "under" critical notices and prizes.
The equivalent in literature would be Raymond Chandler's depression pulp-magazine
novelettes or the current science fiction of
James G. Ballard. Farber quite seriously argued that Academy Awards and acclaim in
magazine articles had damaged the subsequent pictures of the directors he praised .
Prestige had raised their budgets and changed
the working conditions of their sets.
Farber's argument reappears in the film
criticism of Andrew Sarris who claims that
John Ford's "commercial" work at Fox for
Shirley Temple and Will Rogers contains
more relaxed, better shot scenes than filmsociety items like Lost Patrol and The Informer. where he is "pushing." ;Farber's article
anticipates the conditions under which JeanLuc Godard later shot all his features except
the Bardot film . Contempt. Did Godard read
Farber? No. In spirit every name on the Cahiers masthead could have signed the famous
dedication "To Monogram Pictures," which
begins Breathless and Godard's career in features.
By discussing Farber and Cahiers I have
been able to lift up one of the main themes
among the most prominent critics of the sixties. Pauline Kael and Andrew Sarris. Kael's
criticism has been thoroughly collected in
three books (1965. 1968, 1969), but Sarris'
books are less important than some of his
uncollected journalism for Film Culture and
Village Voice. After Sarris and Kael, the main
trend in American books of movie criticism
has been a change in the amount of information and history that publishers will permit.
There is a striking contrast between present
books and an older work like Robert Lewis
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Taylor's biography, W. C. Fields ( 1949). a
minor masterpiece of American humor even
if it is short on historical depth. Later critics
pay Taylor the tribute of looting from his
book, and many articles on Fields' movies
quote incidents from Taylor's account of
Fields' private life with the suggestion that
they appear in his films .
Despite his research. much of Taylor's film
"history" is impossible fiction. It should be
read like Wodehouse or Firbank. (A few of the
inconsistencies are mentioned by a real cineaste, William Everson, in his picture-book.
The Art of W. C. Fields.) Taylor offhandedly
slurs D. W. Griffith. who died during the
writing of the book. The reader of the book
might be led to consider silent-film directors
to be amateurish clowns in comparison with
the great masters of 1948-1949. Taylor succeeds mostly as a novelist, conveying the fears
with which Fields began his second film career in the early thirties and by not slowing
the flow of his story with too many checkable
facts .

Faith in the Old Hollywood M ovie
Film-books and magazines now aim beyond
Taylor's amiable, middlebrow, barbershop
reader. 1959. 1960, and 1965 produced the
standard histories of the Japanese, Russian,
and (silent) German films. The German book
is Lotte Eisner's revision of an earlier, less
ambitious text, L'Ecran Demoniaque (recently translated for the University of California
Press as The Haunted Screen .) Kino. Jay Leyda's Soviet book. actually day-dates the premiere of every Russian production released
at the time of his book's publication in 1960.
Older Hollywood "historians" were exhausted
by the research effort of reading the annual
New York Times Digest copying the date of
the Manhattan opening and then printing said
date as the world premiere. See. for example,
the John Bainbridge biography of Garbo
(1955).

The Japanese Film ( 1959) by Joseph Anderson and Donald Richie is such a thorough job
that Richie has since published several solo
books without adding much to the picture
given by the first volume. The co-authors
produced an industrial history which is also
a critical and fascinating sociological study
of Japan . Did you know that early Japanese
film audiences faced sidewise so that they
could watch the picture and its projection at
once? The complete production history in
The Japanese Film provides materials lacking
in the writing of the older film theorists and
critics of Hollywood studios. According to
Anderson and Richie, the "Hollywood" trend
towards specialized studios and genre production developed in Japan as well as in Los
Angeles. The same psychological types appeared among the Japanese production heads.
A "Louis B. Mayer" or a "J. Arthur Rank"
is apparently an organizational type rather
than an individual.

Richie's several books discovered a culture
hero in Akira Kurosawa . Kurosawa shot more
dramatic and more salable films than Farber's
undergrounders and felt no need to half-conceal his education and ideas on the screen .
Kuro's awa's versions of Shakespeare. Gorky .
and Dostoyevsky may not be his best pictures .
But his directorial poise and surety contrasts
absolutely with the morally cuatious melodramas of Hawks or John Ford. (Recall especially Ford's American-Catholic blindness
to the values of Graham Greene's whiskeypriest novel when Ford tried to shoot it in
1947.) Kurosawa is the apotheosis of the
action film-maker. the best commercial director who ever lived . Were the American magazine critics truly converted to the Cahiers
faith in the old Hollywood movie. now improved by Kurosawa? Alas. they backslid .
Except for Yojimbo. with its unwashed
hero. K urosawa 's pictures undergo a hail of
negative reviews. Why? Too commercial!
And so the converted sinners return to their
old elitism , in politics as in art. Kurosawa is
treated by our critics as some sort of secondary
support for a real master like Godard. But
Godard's films - like, Flaherty's famous old
documentaries - show an absolute inability
to structure a story line in a way that has
always been second nature to the Japanese.
Once again technical facility becomes suspect.
In terms of production information. Richie's
The Films of Akira Kurosawa ( 1965) must be
the first serious director's study ever published . The other big director's books of the sixties are Francois Truffaut's interview-book
with Hitchcock (1967) and Marie Seton's
Sergei M. Eisenstein (1960) . Seton's life has
the personal values of Edmund Wilson's
memorial essay to Edna St. Vincent Millay .
But most important has been the series trend.
Pride of place goes to the Paris Cinema Aufourd 'hui series , which began with Georges
Sadoul's book on Georges Melies . Cresset
readers with no French should still check the
French series for their wonderful filmographies. In England the younger Sz;l(ht and Sound
feature writers began a con tern porary series ,
reprinted in this country as the Cinema World
series . But by far the best volume is the interview book, Losey on Losey. This book is invaluable as theatre history for Brecht. the depression stage. and Joseph McCarthy-era Hollywood politics.
Every title mentioned in this survey of recent film-books has been paperbacked and can
be located in the nearest catalog of paperback books in print. But for anything found
unavailable, the best search source is a good
college library film-book collection . The three
best I know are University of Wisconsin (Madison) . University of Illinois (Urbana) and
University of Kansas (Lawrence). Interlibrary loan is available for the serious student
or film-society operator.

MARK PURCELL
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An American Biblical Theology Movement

BIBLICAL THEOLOGY IN CRISIS . By
Brevard S. Childs . Philadelphia : Westminster. 1970 .
THE OLD TESTAMENT AND THEOLOGY. By G. Ernest Wrig-ht. New York: Harper and Row, 1969.
Can the Bible ever regain an influential
role in American theology? There is hardly
a church body that does not suffer the agony
of internal friction and discord. In several
there are those who like to describe the liberal-conservative axis of polarity in terms of an
attitude toward the Scriptures. The "Biblicists" have no use for the "social ·activists."
the traditionalists are regarded with impatience by the innovationists. and in any case
the feeling is mutual. Yet all in some sense
appeal to the Bible in support of their position. And the ensuing battle the air is filled
with a Babel of theologies . This theological
variety store delights those who thrive on
options as much as it dismays those who long
for a basic unity, while others are driven to
apathy and cynicism.
Two recent publications have appeared ,
each in its own way arguing that the Bible
can lighten our darkness and ought to be
taken seriously in theological discourse. Brevard S. Childs of Yale offers his hermeneutical suggestions in Biblical Theology in Crisis,
and G. Ernest Wright of Harvard draws upon
O.T. exegetical insights as a contribution to
current theology in his The 0 . T. and Theology.
Childs' analysis of the crisis takes its point
of departure in the promise held out by objective, critical Biblical studies. in this country
following the Second World War. At that time
tht ·e emerged a particular way of doing
theology in concert with Biblical studies that
was not only sufficiently distinct from European styles. but pronounced enough to be
termed an American Biblical Theology Movement. Its major elements of consensus were
the "theological dimension" of the Bible, the
unity of the whole Bible, the revelation of
God in history, and the distinctive mentality
of the Bible in contrast to its environment.
Thi~ consensus, however, was largely visceral
and more intuitive than precisely formulated .
The Movement failed to develop a central
perspective, it did not develop anything of the
devotional quality of an Adolf Schlatter, nor
did it ever become translated into educational
policy either at the seminary or parish level.
The "theological dimension" proved particularly elusive, especially under the pressure of
a growing insistence on distinguishing sharply between the descriptively historical. scientifically objective task of Biblical studies on
the one hand, and the subjective value judgements and homiletical application on the
other. The crisis arises as that distinction
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grew and hardened into a yawning , seemingly unbridgeable chasm . Childs therefore calls
for a discipline that will attempt to synthesize the various facets of descriptive Biblical
studies, to bring Biblical studies to bear in
fruitful mutuality with the task of constructive, systematic theology . and to work toward
a Biblical theology that will be both relevant
to current concerns and faithful to the pastoral needs of the parish.
Who cannot be sympathetic with such an
aspiration? Childs freely conc~des that such
a discipline must be as much an art as a
science, and that it would represent a gift of
God as much as a disciplined objective of the
scholar. "It was not by accident," he confesses
"that a working pastor in the forgotten Swiss
village of Safenwil first discovered what Romans could mean to a congregation before
dropping his theological bomb on the scholarly community. Fortunately God still has a
way of making use of the Bible which is not
synchronized to the publication schedule of
the religious press."
In order to pursue the task so defined , it is
obviously necessary to employ the best in
historical , literary, and philological scholarship of the Bible. But the fundamental problem is one of discovering the appropriate
context for such studies. The failure of Biblical studies to provide for the theological needs
of the Church suggests the place to look. The
appropriate context for doing Biblical theology, Childs argues, is the canon of the Christian Church . The emphasis in this thesis falls
not on an exact enumeration of canonical
books, but on the canon as embodying a normative tradition that is treasured in a continuous community of faith . By saying that
the canon enshrines a normative tradition he
rejects any merely illustrative function of the
Bible in the Church . And the requirement
that the interpreter stand in that tradition of
the community of faith does not represent a
spirit of bondage to dogmatic restriction. but
signals a joyful freedom to discover the wealth
it contains.
An important inference that he draws from
this thesis is that, while the O .T . by virtue of
its historical priority illuminates the N .T .. in
the Christian canon the O.T. must also be
interpreted in the light of theN .T. That prickly consequence flows out of the recognition
that the O .T . is differently understood when
appropriated through the medium of the tradition of Judaism . Neither the Christian nor
the Jewish community of faith any longer have
a direct relation to the original historical context of Israel. It is therefore important also to
aim at a recovery of an exegetical method
which can interpret the Bible as a whole. In
this respect we can learn much of. value from
the art of great pre-critical Biblical theolo-

gians like Origen , Augustine, Luther. and
Calvin. Their greatness consisted not least in
their readiness to read the Bible as the Scripture of the Church, where it is used also as
devotional literature.

Faith, Piety, and Biblical Criticism
The crisis in Biblical theology is exacerbated by its seeming inability to deal with
the urgent social issu'es of our day . Can the
Bible provide ethical norms for the exceedingly complex problems of the modern world?
Childs thinks so. He observes. first of all , that
the knowledge of the (moral) will of God has
always been simultaneously a datum of revelation and a goal to be achieved . Secondly.
he calls for c'isciplined theological reflection
which takes its starting point in current issues
as seen in relation to the canonical context
of the Church . That canon displays a variety
of warrants , by which Childs seems to mean a
range of Biblically sanctioned patterns of
response to ethical issues. Hence it is a mistake to confuse Christian consenus on moral
issues with the Gospel. And thirdly he points
to that level of Biblical thought where the
problem is not to know the good , but to do
the known will of God ; indeed , the battle
between the good and the evil frequently lies
beyond the merely cognitive level.
In the final section Childs includes three
essays as examples of his alternative method
of doing Biblical theology in the context of
the Church's canon , and one essay of concluding hermeneutical reflection . If one W.!re
disposed to be contentious . it would be possible to quarrel with Childs at a number of
points . All of them , however, should be traceable to the fact that, while he draws upon the
resources of his own Calvinist tradition , it is
here being reviewed by one whose heritage
is Lutheran . Important issues are doubtless
at stake in that difference.
However, in Childs' lament over the fragmented state of Biblical theology . for his insistence on the canon of the Church as the
appropriate context for doing Biblical theology , and because of his responsible attempt to
exemplify a positive alternative. he is a kindred spirit and his book deserves the highest
commendation . It should be read by every
parish pastor who fears , often with considerable justification , that critical , Biblical
studies destroy genuine faith and piety . It
need not be so; in fact , such studies can purify
and enrich them. But this book ought also to
be read by Biblical scholars . at whatever level
they work , as a sobering reminder of the
sacred tradition in which they stand and of
the solemn responsibility that is theirs with
this subject matter.
Wright is aminated by a related concern .
Like Childs he wants to bring the results of
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O.T. scholarship to bear on current theological problems. He addresses himself however.
not so much to the hereneu tical problems of
Biblical interpretation . but seeks rather to
address necessary O .T . exegetical insights to
a crippled style of theology . The problem he
sees in contemporary Christian theology is its
Christomonism. A theology which has been
dissolved into Christology is ill-fitted to address the modern world . Such unitarianism of
the Second Person cannot be helpful without
anything to say about God . unless faith be
conceived merely as optimism .
The remedy for this disease is a recovery of
a theology that can handle not only the O.T .
and the N.T . together . but that can also offer
a Biblical understanding of revelation . That
is the urgent necessity for Wright. and he
aligns himself with Pannenberg and Kaufmann in their call for a theology that has history as its central category or matrix of all

thinking about God and his revelation . To the
undergirding of that matrix he brings three
basic O.T. motifs : God the Creator. God the
Lord . and God the Warrior. These he recommends as vital Biblical resources for an understanding of man in history . and as an antidote to an exclusive. N.T . based " Christian
henotheism ".
Wright has certainl y offered a salutarv corrective from the O.T. to theological discourse
that is unnecessarily impoverished for ignoring it. He does not intend to present a complete or a balanced Biblical theology : he is .
after all. leaning against the breeze. But.
despite an occasional hint as to the relation
between the O .T . and the N.T .· . he does not
seem to allow sufficiently for the influence of
the N.T. upon a Christian reading of the
O .T .. and hence his contribution from Biblical theology is less than it might be.
This insufficiency becomes evident in his

chapter on "Language. Symbol. and Faith ."
The chasm between infinitude and finitude
is not bridged by any mediation of the Incarnation . nor is his preoccupation with noest:,
challenged by any N.T . emphasis on faith as
entry into a new life. for which the problem
of epistemology takes a subordinate position
to proclamatory witness. Hence also the
thesis that "what is basically Biblical is a
special political understanding of the universe" does not betray any tension with the
N.T . insistence that the universe is not. however. only political.
Wright has sustained his case that a theology that ignores the O .T. is needlessly crippled and even distorted . That is the merit of
this book . II is case is vulnerable though to the
opposite charge. that a theology constructed
out of the O .T . is in danger of shutting out
all that is decisively new .
WALTER E. KELLER

The Penguin Critical Anthologies
WALT WHITMAN : A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY. Edited by Francis Murphy . 1969 ,
Penguin Press, $2 .25 .
Among publishers of quality paperbacks .
Penguin Books merits praise for careful selection of especially significant reprint materials. How often an earnest reader must search
in sometimes inaccessible places and within
incomplete files of periodicals (particularly
the learned journals) or among mutilated
copies of out-of-print books for this kind of
primary source material! Indeed the specialized reader who is seeking additional perspective for his own appraisal of a great writer
and of his meritorious writings needs this
kind of compilation .
Penguin Critical Anthologies are published
inexpensively and very conveniently in paperbound format, and are gradually increasing
in offerings. Averaging 300 pages of effectively related articles. each volume presents
first, and systematically. a dozen or more of
Contemporaneous Criticisms which reflect
the earlier impressions as viewed by the critics . This is followed by diversified Modern
Views (and here it is especially interesting to
observe the range of topics and emphases).
For older writers such as Edmund Spenser, a
middle section provides an extra unit. E .g . the
Walt Whitman volume illustratively adds 16
essays here under the caption "The Developing Debate."
Now available are Geoffrey Chaucer ed .
J.A. Burrow ; Edmund Spencer ed. Paul J .
Alpers ; fohn Webster ed . G .K . and S.K .
Hunter; Andrew Marvelled . John Carey; and
Walt Whitman ed . Francis Murphy.
Announced for late 1970 are Henn"k Ibsen
ed. James McFarlane; Charles Dickens ed.
Stephen Wall; Alexander Pope ed. F .W. Bateson and N. Joubovsky; plus Ezra Pound ed.
J.P. Sullivan. May the list continue to grow!
A brief word is in place at this point, about

January, 1971

a parallel but more specialized , similar anthology-series by the same publisher. The Penguin Shakespeare Library uses the same
editorial policies and book size, etc. Sample
concentrations are Coleridge on Shakespeare
ed . Terence Stawkes; also Shaw on Shakespeare ed . Edwin Wilson; etc. The topical
divisions are called , e.g. General Principles;
The Plays ; The Philosopher; The Dramatist ;
and The Interpreters, namely the Actors .
HERBERT H. UMBACH

GEOFFREY CHAUCER : A CRITICAL
ANTHOLOGY . Edited by J. A. Burrow .
New York : Penguin Books. 1969 .
That component in the scholarly instinct
which thrives on gossip from the past should
react to this anthology with great satisfaction .
Of course. one must take "gossip " in a somewhat rarified sense. but in this new Penguin
the reader can find "What Dryden (or Gower
or Pope or Johnson or Arnold or even Chaucer) said about Chaucer." Indeed . the list of
those who mentioned Chaucer in literary
criticism before 1900 is a rich and magnificent roster, and their successors , the modern
academics , seem a pale lot by comparison .
While Charles Muscatine and Erich Auerbach and F. W. Bateson and even C . S. Lewis
write criticism weighted with all the knowledge that modern research has to offer. and
they make what must be called " significant
contributions to the field of Chaucer study ,"
they do not dazzle or delight the mind (Lewis
possibly excepted) like Dryden's elegant comment, or Leigh Hunt's neat mots justes. or
Blake's terse yet extravagant rhetoric .
Criticism always reveals the critic, and in
this collection our age once again stands forth
in all its basic drabness . The selection of

moderns, intentionally the longest. is full of
the hesitancy. anxiety. cautiousness of the
learned man of our time. As the editor notes
in his introduction to the section "Modern
Views": This university criticism lacks what
W. P. Ker called the "disengaged" note of
Dryden's criticism; for its exponents are .
above all , engaged with their chosen author .
So it is not easy for them to pronounce - or
even . sometimes . to reckon with - the judgement of the common reader . Their criticism
does not . characteristically , place Chaucer in
a broad literary context. defining his weaknesses as well as his strengths. as Dryden's
does . It is sometimes rather parochial.
Burrow goes on to say that this modern
criticism has "many compensating virtues";
it is scholarly . based on better texts . and it
sees Chaucer "from many more points of
view ." This reviewer has begun- to wonder
whether 5uch a many-pointed view is indeed a
virtue. or (academic heresy) a false and
illusory goal in education as well as in criticism . Were someone to ask me for a good
piece of Chaucer criticism , I would point
them to Dryden , with all his limited vision.
poor texts . misunderstandings and egotistical
self-assertions. rather than to the cautious
academic of today.
To provide that choice, however. is the
virtue of the anthology. and therein lies its
value to both scholar and amateur. For the
scholar nothing here is new , but it is convenient , and the juxtapositions may be illuminating. In the case of the reader , the
amateur, this volume. and the others in the
series , presupposes and rewards a knowledge
or at least an interest in the subject. and will
also be a short history of criticism. It will
whet the appetite for Chaucer. and that must
be criticism 's highest gift to literature.
GAIL M . EIFRIG
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The Visual Arts

Art and Nature
------------------------------------------------------------------------ByRICHARDH.W. BRAUER

To drink water is to drink universal water.

Siren Osvald

Every ordering gesture is a signal of transcendence.

Peter Berger

The whole creation is on tiptoe to see the wonderful sight of the sons of
God coming into their own. And the hope is that in the end the whole
of created life will be rescued from the tyranny of change and decay.
and have its share in that magnificent liberty which can only belong
to the children of God .
Romans 8:19, 21 (Phillips)

Last year it seemed that spring would never come.
Even the beg;inning; of April brought violent winter
storms. Walking; around my campus on those endlessly g-rey days, looking; at the bare trees against the overcast sky, I found myself half seriously thinking that
the cycles of nature might not continue. News of the
environment, here and afar, was, with few exceptions,
news of its deterioration. For the first time I began really to distrust the stability of nature itself. Lifeless branches and sunless skies of winter joined the news of environmental deterioration and gave me a vision of nature
irreversibly stripped of beauty.
Mere intellectual knowledge of the grim consequences
for man in nature (if he does not discipline his exploitation of it) does not prepare one for the feeling of loss
of natural beauty and harmony. In a society of runaway
change, the predictable forms and reassuring rhythms
of nature had signaled the presence of power greater
than man to me - even signaled the existence of divine
power. Now the rhythms of nature seem fragile and
mutable; their continuation apparently resting, to a
large extent, in the hands of man.
If mankind has this power and responsibility, it also
needs to strengthen its insights into the related wholeness, and even into the spiritual potential, of the manysided natural world.
Landscape painting in both the western and eastern
worlds has been a means to find insights into the natural
world. Begun ·near the end of the middle ages in the
west, landscape painting has been used to record appearances, to express feelings and fantasies, to teach
Christian doctrine through symbols, to visualize classical ideals of form , and to picture utopian life. In the
twentieth century, the microscopic, telescopic, and
mathematical descriptions of nature and its processes
have paralleled the efforts of many artists to probe the
underlying and abstract order of nature. The kinds of
order found in nature (from atomic nuclei to the galaxies)' vary from the modular systems of crystal structures, to the organic and g-estalt forms of plants and
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animals, to the nearly chaotic vitality of the larger
landscapes.
Modern artists have been attracted to the poetic possibilities of each kind of order: the constructivists
(Max Bill), the vitalists (Henry Moore), and the Happeners (Allan Kaprow) of seemingly random and chance
events. But if it is true that mankind needs to strengthen its sense of the oneness and spiritual coherence of
the natural order we should also look to the expressions of those artists who combine the regularity and
vitality of nature within powerful, summary, gestalt
forms.
Robert Kostka's paintings present such images of the
natural world. In Wind through the Prairie (cover)
wind and grass are one. In it we glimpse the vital tang.le
and free-flow of uncultivated nature. Waterfall also
at first seems almost artless. However, the faultless
adjustments that keep alive the simple forms are soon
apparent. The title then directs the beholder to see the
forms as representing a mountain stream pouring out
of the cleft of a rock. The water sparkles, the mist rises.
The abstraction is transformed. We are in the presence
of idyllic, untrammeled nature. Forest Spirit is as
concentrated and abbreviated as short hand. These
branch-like chromosomes glow and fade, lean and prop
in a quiet interplay. Similar cell-like forms form the
bird Manitou. Manitou is certainly more than the sum
of his parts, a "thou" of nature, not an "it."
Of these paintings Kostka writes:
My Sumi paintings are gestures . . . if not forms found in the natural
world , then movements of that world. I do not work in Sumi because
it is oriental, I work in it because it requires the speed and precision
of the shutter of a camera. There are no second takes . There is ultimate reality in the fixed presence of a line.

Of his painting Idle Moon (inside cover) Kostka
writes:
I became interested in the art of the American Indian . particularly
the plains Indians who saw the completion of their lives . their unity
with all living things. in the phases of the moon. It was perhaps a greater belief in its all encompassing scale than our merely walking upon
it. " Idle Moon " was the season when the world was in suspension between the death of life, called winter, and the rebirth of the principle
of life, spring. My "moon" oils started in 1960 and are meant to be
contemplative, slow, quiet discoveries.

Such paintings can inspire us again to try to live m
simple harmony with nature.
The Cresset

Robert Kostka , Manitou . 1963. 16" x 12 ", Sumi ink on
paper. Collection of Peter Selz .

Robert Kostka . Waterfall , 1964. 16" x 12 ", Sumi ink on Uwa paper.

..

Robert Kostka, Forest Spirit, 1962 . 12" x 16", Sumi ink
on paper.
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The Theatre

Teatro Furioso vs. Verbal Wonder
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------By WALTER SORELL

It is easy to get bored with the theatre these days. It is
just as easy to get excited about it. The world - I mean
the one concerned about the stage - seems split into a
left and right, into those who like Orlando Furioso and
those who prefer Jack MacGowran in his one-man show
of Beckett's world. (The silent majority eats popcorn in
the movies and drinks Pilsner, as advertized, in front of
the television set.)
I saw Luca Ronconi's production of Orlando Furioso
on the main piazza of Lugano last summer. I had heard
of its phenomenal "success" in Spoleto and Edinburgh
and other European cities, but I did not take it too seriously. I did not report about my impressions and reactions to it because I felt it was a gigantic "happening"
which carried the misconception of audience participation to an absurd climax. But now that this production
came to New York's bubble in Bryant Park and split the
theatre-goers into violent deniers of a hoax and vehement yes-sayers of a new, exciting, most alive theatre
experience, I cannot help taking issue with it.
These are decisive moments in world history. Why
shouldn't they be just as momentous in the theatre? It
boils down to the question whether we should give up
the idea of theatre as a visual and aural spectacle created
by meaningful drama or comedy. We know about the
devaluation of the word in our century and the growing
preponderance of everything visual. Orlando Furioso
takes the theatre to the streets, to the populace - in
contrast to the bourgeois elite of traditional spectators.
l 1. a way Ronconi was inspired by the "happenings"
which started in the New World and went all the way
back to the commedia dell' arte technique aided by
technological means, mixing both into undoubtedly
lively events - but is it alive and stimulating theatre?
Is it entertaining?
I met some very erudite people among the yes-sayers.
I asked them what they liked about it. The keyword was
"fun." It was fun io be a part of a show whose actors have
fun and make fun of the audience while poking fun at
themselves and Ariosto's world as well as our own. I
admit it is not a show for sedentary people sitting in
loges and plush-covered chairs. You are supposed to
ambulate from one place to another of several simultaneous happenings. If you are not fast enough in moving
around, trolleys on which action is mounted come
quickly towards you, and you have to run in order to
avoid being run over. This is undoubtedly new and fun
and enjoyable, as things on a childlike level are quite
relaxing at times. Who does not like to dream himself
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back into childhood?
The theme of Orlando is an apparent pretext, offering great possibilities for this kind of multiple, spectacular staging. It is not non-verbal theatre. It borrowed
from Grotowski the technique of selecting the text from
the original at will. Ariosto's stanzas are translated into
idiomatic Italian, and the actors speak at a rapid pace
explaining to the audience as much as to themselves
what they are doing. Even the delivery of their lines is
a visual rather than an aural experience (this becomes
particularly clear through the reactions of those who
have no knowledge of Italian).
It is "fun" to watch the grotesquely exaggerated props
on the trolleys, dinosauric monsters, flying machines of
the latest Leonardo da Vinci models, and the actors
riding on such parodies of props spitting their phrases
with the genuine gesture and pomposity of Italian
pathos. It may be fun, but is it good theatre - indeed, is
it theatre? If it is a pass:ng fad, we need no answer. If
it is a trend, then we no longer have to worry about the
answer. To this viewer it seems to go back to the very
beginning of all theatre, to the threshold on which an
actor fumbled to find meaning in what he did, groping
for the word in his gesture. Orlando Furioso is circusy
Pop art.
On the other hand, imagine a bare stage with two
small rocks and a swirling, non-descriptive decor by
Ming Cho Lee (perhaps of a moonlost world). An old
man, clad in a long, shabby coat, his sockless feet in
loosely tied shoes, a model of a tatterdemalion entering the stage. He only speaks to himself while letting us
listen and watch him. He is a sum total of Samuel Beckett images, opening his mind to his past, to his now, forgetting, coming back to his beginning, walking in a
seemingly endless circle through what people call life
until he finally looks up or rather into himself, saying:
"You must go on, you can't go on . .. I'll go on ... "
The man is Jack MacGowran, who, with Beckett's
help, has taken passages and phrases from twelve different works, plays, novels, and poetry, and, alone on stage,
creates the world of the writer. It is an evening of the
very poetry of life - however desperate and despairing - and illumines a world which is our world. Beckett's words often lose themselves in the absurdity of
existence, but time and again light up like a revelation
of the mystery which, as we only too well know, will
always remain a mystery. But there is solace in the moments of despair, in the resigned acceptance of: "There
I am." It is theatre spoken with the voice of man's soul.
The Cresset

Editor-A t- Large

By JOHN STRIETELMEIER

The Low, Dishonest Decade

The bells that rang in this new year of 1971 rang out
not only the old year but also the seventh decade of the
Twentieth Century. This seems, therefore, an appropriate time to attempt some assessment of these past
ten years.
It was, I would suggest, a time when the apostolic prediction became fully and evidently true. It was a perilous time. Men were lovers of their own selves, covetous,
boasters, proud ~ blasphemers, disobedient to parents ,
unthankful, unholy, without natural affection , refusing
to yield, false accusers, incontinent, savage, despisers
of those who are good, traitors, reckless , puffed up,
lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God - having
a form of godliness but denying the power of it.
All of this, you may say, could have been said of any
previous generation. And that is true. But previous generations might have confessed these faults to their
shame. In the Sixties of the Twentieth Century, we
learned to glory in our shame - or at least to justify it
as a normal, healthy way of doing our own thing.
To say these things is to invite the charge that one
has grown old and cantankerous, that one is no longer
with it and therefore envious of those who are still capable of making the scene. Thus are moral objections
answered in our increasingly irrational age - by appeals to the calendar and to a bastardized psychology.
And it is no comfort to anyone who is attempting, in his
own way, to defend the moral imperatives of the Christian witness to find himself pitted against pastors and
priests of that faith who have forsaken the word entrusted to them and become minstrels of the New Freedom.
For our nation, the Sixties were , as Auden described
the Thirties, "a low, dishonest decade. " By a cynical
perversion of the doctrine of collective security, we
launched in southeast Asia a war whose ultimate obscenity is clearly evident to everybody but ourselves.
It must be said that twice we voted against that war once when we overwhelmingly denied the Presidency
to Barry Goldwater and his policy of defoliation and
once when we elected Richard M. Nixon, who had assured us that he had a plan to end the war. For those of
us who have been urging young people not to despair
of accomplishing their legitimate objectives by working
through The System it is discouraging to have to confess that, at least on the great matter of war and peace,
January, 1971

The System has not proved itself responsive even to the
apparent longings of the Silent Majority.
Domestically, we have largely failed to meet the two
great crises of our time, the racial problem and the
problem of poverty. Racism is as deeply woven into the
fabric of the American Way of Life in 1971 as it was in
1961 and many of our black citizens, despairinK of any
really meaningful integration, have opted for the bitter
alternative of separatism. And the poor? We keep them
as invisible as possible, and when they do appear we
disclaim any responsibility for their condition, alleg-ingthat the fault lies either in their genes (about which we
can do nothing) or in their attitudes (which, we insist,
it is their responsibility to change). And for these failures of love and justice we pay a heavy price in crime
and disorder, as Ramsey Clark keeps trying- to remind
us and as J. Edgar Hoover continues to explain in simplistic terms that appeal to the prejudices of the middle
class.
I seem, much against my will, to have launched upon
a jeremiad. Which is an odd thing coming from me, of
all people. For the lines have fallen to me in very pleasant places indeed. And maybe it is just because I have
seen how good and pleasant it can be for good and kindly people to work and play and worship together that I
hate and despise those false prophets who would have us
believe that war is peace and licentiousness is freedom
and love is a four-letter word . It is a lie, a damnable lie ,
and every instinct of charity or ordinary humaneness
should drive us to oppose those false apostles of freedom who have brought us so close to madness that many
of us can survive only by escaping to a world of illusions and hallucinations.
It will have been noted, perhaps, that in all of this I
have made only a passing reference to the role of the
Church in the affairs of this past decade. I am well acquainted with only one Christian denomination and it
seemed to me that the kindest service I could perform
for my fathers and brethren in that denomination would
be to pass over the events of recent years in silence.
Suffice it to say that the Spirit has, as always, been in
the Church, and it is perhaps evidence of my own
myopia that I have seen so little evidence of His working. But I can not report on what I have not seen, and
you wouldn't believe me if I reported on what I have
seen.
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By 0. P . KRETZMA N N

"All the trumb ets sounded (or him on th e other side"
PILGRIJ\!'S PROGR ESS

A Small Voice from Far A way

stand? ...

I hardly know where to begin . . . . This month and
next my "hie et nunc" son and I are to discuss "Education" with a capital "E" and all due reverence .... After
all, Education is the way man lives from decade to
decade and from century to century ... .It participates
in the beleaguered hope that there is wisdom in the
human race , that this wisdom is cumulative, and that it
can, in part, be passed on in books, classrooms, graffiti
on back fe nces, whispers over dying fires, or swift
punches in the nose ....
There is doubtl essly such a thing as Education, my
"hicet nunc " son, even if we do not always know exactly
what it is at all times .... We do know that in your time
and generation it is failing pathetically .. . .It is weighted
down with your generation's whimpers of irrelevance ....
In your time there are cries of a world nearly running
ou t of fresh air, clean water, natural resources and
beauty, and enough food .. .. The body is not alone in
its distress . ... Archibald MacLeish, a poet not of your
generation, recently said: "There is something terrible
happening to the human soul" ....
What happened? . ... You did learn something . . . .
You are the first generation in human history to learn
that you carry strontium 90 in your bones and DDT in
your fat .. . .Almost from birth your generation learned
that we can commit collective suicide (we gave you a
small taste at Hiroshima) .... You know that you hav e
been born into a world in which knowledge, the aim of
all education in our time , often leads to catastrophe ....
In fact , we have already made such progress into this
murky land of technique that we can lump the dyin g
fish , the glutted city, the stun ted tree, the masses on the
campuses, and the starving child under a magnificently
evasive and abstract phrase : "a maladjusted ecology" ....
Now at this moment in history , amid all the cries
echoing up from exhausted wells, you and your geQeration enter the world and want to set it aright before
sunset. .. .And the only equipment for this desperate
task which we have given you is your education with a
little "e'' . . .. Furthermore, to complete the debacle, as
I have said, we do not know what we really want to give
you and you do not know what you want. ...
And so I have been tossing on my bed these many
nights trying to find what I would like to say in this
exchange of views .... Is it possible, as the rising sun
comes through the East windows, that I have for forty
years triLd to do something that I could not under-

As I tossed I decided that the ultimate goal of Education must be said in a way so simplified and cleansed
that even your recalcitrant generation can understand
it. .. .Therefore, I submit to you that the end of Education , all education, can be finally summed up in two
abused, misunderstood, vitally important words: "Freedom and Obedience" ... .These two realities - sweeping over earth and heaven, over all you know and all
you do not know, over your dreams with only a gossamer of thought - will make sense and order of your
life and lead you into light for our dark times . ...
"Freedom and Obedience" .... My thesis is that without these paradoxical twins you cannot claim to be truly
Educated .. .. You may know many things but their sum
will be nothing . . . .
I thought I heard you sigh with relief when I first
mentioned the magic word (for you) . . . . "Freedom"
. . .. At last, you thought, the old man has come belatedly to his senses . . . . "Freedom," that's the key to
what my contemporaries, the "hie et nunc " crowd,
really wants .... Freedom to explore, to fly beyond th e
morning and evening stars, to reach the border between
sense and non-sense with the power to go either way
without penalties ... .
But there's the rub .... For the line between sense and
non-sense becomes the path of a drunkard at the midnight hour of the world .. .. Your generation (or a large
part of it) has drifted into a "freedom " which is a hollow,
mean, and hypocritical thing .... It lets you trip off the
edge of reality . . . .It has no tie with sanity ....
Here is my real hang up .... You should - you must
- be free .... But "Freedom " is not the freedom your
generation sings about - a singing which has now begun to sound pitifully like screaming ....
So - I have again shifted the conversation ... .I am
no longer speaking directly to Education but to its goal
of Freedom and Obedience .... I believe what we need
to seek first is a reasoned , socially and theologically
acceptable meaning of Freedom .... And here, I submit,
your "hie et nunc " crowd, with its marching and countermarching, its confrontations, bricks and stones, has
failed with a startling unanimity and irrelevance .. ..
My generation must share in that failure, although I
really thought we had done better than that ... .
Perhaps, in closing, I should say quietly and gently:
"Freedom is the right to discipline yourself so as not to
be disciplined by others" . ... Not bad . ... Finally, Hitler
or yourself.... Or possibly even God? ... .
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